Re: [PATCH 0/4] hash.h: support choosing a separate SHA-1 for non-cryptographic uses

From

Taylor Blau <me@ttaylorr.com>

Date

Sep 5, 2024, 17:51 UTC

Message-ID

<ZtnvjlW3DotdK/lB@nand.local>

In-Reply-To

<ZtnkovOqrJNxUtez@nand.local>

On Thu, Sep 05, 2024 at 01:04:34PM -0400, Taylor Blau wrote:

> On Thu, Sep 05, 2024 at 09:51:00AM -0700, Junio C Hamano wrote:
> > Taylor Blau <me@ttaylorr.com> writes:
> >
> > > If so, I agree, but would note that this series does not yet switch
> > > index-pack to use the non-collision detecting SHA-1 implementation when
> > > available, so that would not be a prerequisite for merging this series.
> >
> > Hmph, I am confused.  It needs to be corrected in order to address
> > collisions of the tail sum Peff raised, as no longer checked the
> > tail sum with SHA1DC but with "fast" SHA-1.
>
> Peff's mail supposes that we have already modified index-pack to use the
> non-collision detecting SHA-1 implementation. But this series does not
> do that, so I don't think we have an issue to address here.
>
> In a hypothetical future series where we do modify index-pack to use the
> _FAST SHA-1 implementation, then we would need to address the issue that
> Peff raised first as a prerequisite.

--- 8< ---

diff --git a/sha1/openssl.h b/sha1/openssl.h
index 1038af47da..f0d5c59c43 100644
--- a/sha1/openssl.h
+++ b/sha1/openssl.h
@@ -32,6 +32,8 @@ static inline void openssl_SHA1_Final(unsigned char *digest,
 {
 	EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx->ectx, digest, NULL);
 	EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx->ectx);
+	memset(digest, 0, 19);
+	digest[19] &= 0x3;
 }

 static inline void openssl_SHA1_Clone(struct openssl_SHA1_CTX *dst,
--- >8 ---

and then creating a victim.git repository (which in my case was born
from git.git) and then repacking to produce the following state:

    $ ls -la victim.git/objects/pack
    total 262704
    drwxr-xr-x 2 ttaylorr ttaylorr      4096 Sep  5 13:45 .
    drwxr-xr-x 4 ttaylorr ttaylorr      4096 Sep  5 13:46 ..
    -r--r--r-- 1 ttaylorr ttaylorr   3306804 Sep  5 13:45 pack-0000000000000000000000000000000000000003.bitmap
    -r--r--r-- 1 ttaylorr ttaylorr  15588224 Sep  5 13:44 pack-0000000000000000000000000000000000000003.idx
    -r--r--r-- 1 ttaylorr ttaylorr 247865480 Sep  5 13:44 pack-0000000000000000000000000000000000000003.pack
    -r--r--r-- 1 ttaylorr ttaylorr   2226788 Sep  5 13:44 pack-0000000000000000000000000000000000000003.rev

Then I set up an "evil" repository like in Peff's recipe and started
repeatedly pushing. fsck is slow here, so the loop is just "while true",
but it doesn't matter that we're not fscking the victim repository since
I'll show in a second that it's not corrupted to begin with.

Running this loop:

  $ while true
    do
      ls -l ../victim.git/objects/pack/
      git.compile commit --allow-empty -m foo
      git.compile push ../victim.git HEAD:foo
    done
  $ ls -l ../victim.git/objects/pack/

, fails very quickly and produces the following:

    [main 727346d] foo
    Enumerating objects: 12, done.
    Counting objects: 100% (12/12), done.
    Delta compression using up to 20 threads
    Compressing objects: 100% (11/11), done.
    Writing objects: 100% (12/12), 779 bytes | 779.00 KiB/s, done.
    Total 12 (delta 10), reused 0 (delta 0), pack-reused 0 (from 0)
    remote: fatal: final sha1 did not match
    error: remote unpack failed: unpack-objects abnormal exit
    To ../victim.git
     ! [remote rejected] HEAD -> foo (unpacker error)
    error: failed to push some refs to '../victim.git'

The victim repository rightly rejects the push, since even though the
evil repository generated a pack with a colliding checksum value, the
victim repository validated it using the collision-detecting /
non-broken SHA-1 implementation and rejected the pack appropriately.

Of course, if index-pack were updated to use the non-collision detecting
implementation of SHA-1 when compiled using one of the _FAST knobs,
*and* we did blindly updated index-pack to use the _fast variants
without doing anything else in Peff's mail, then we would have
corruption.

But I think the point of Peff's mail is to illustrate that this is only
a problem in a world where index-pack uses the _fast SHA-1
implementation, but does not have any additional protections in place.

Thanks,
Taylor