Re: Git and SHA-1 security (again)
- From
Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
- Date
- Jul 18, 2016, 20:55 UTC
- Message-ID
- <xmqq7fciis45.fsf@gitster.mtv.corp.google.com>
- In-Reply-To
- <CACBZZX4N37Ty2yZosHA+PexscLc_Y4_QDZNktVM8bza_5cGu+g@mail.gmail.com>
Ævar Arnfjörð Bjarmason <avarab@gmail.com> writes:
Show 10 quoted lines
> The reality of the current situation is that it's largely mitigated in > practice because: > > a) it's hard to hand someone a crafted blob to begin with for reasons > that have nothing to do with SHA-1 (they'll go "wtf is this garbage?") > > b) even in that case it's *very* hard to come up with two colliding > blobs that are *useful* for some nefarious purpose, e.g. a program A > that looks normal being replaced by an evil program B with the same > SHA-1.
Thanks. That's a nice rephrasing of
http://public-inbox.org/git/Pine.LNX.4.58.0504291221250.18901%40ppc970.osdl.org/
where Linus explains SHA-1 is not the security, and the real security is in distribution.