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Re: Git and SHA-1 security (again)

From
Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Date
Jul 17, 2016, 16:23 UTC
Message-ID
<20160717162349.GB11276@thunk.org>
In-Reply-To
<20160717154234.GC6644@vauxhall.crustytoothpaste.net>
On Sun, Jul 17, 2016 at 03:42:34PM +0000, brian m. carlson wrote:
> As I said, I'm not planning on multiple hash support at first, but it
> doesn't appear impossible if we go this route.  We might still have to
> rewrite objects, but we can verify signatures over the legacy SHA-1
> objects by forcing them into the old-style object format.

How hard would it be to make the on-disk format be multihash, even if there is no support for anything other than a single hash, at least for now? That way we won't have to rewrite the objects twice.

Personally, so long as the newer versions of the tree are secured, I wouldn't mind if the older commits stayed using SHA1 only. The newer commits are the ones that are most important and security-critical anyway. It seems like the main reason to rewrite all of the objects is to simplify the initial rollout of a newer hash algorithm, no?

		     	   		   - Ted
Previous: brian m. carlsonNext: brian m. carlson
Message 9 of 52 in “Git and SHA-1 security (again)”
  1. Herczeg ZsoltJul 16, 2016
  2. brian m. carlsonJul 16, 2016
  3. Herczeg ZsoltJul 16, 2016
  4. brian m. carlsonJul 16, 2016
  5. Johannes SchindelinJul 17, 2016
  6. brian m. carlsonJul 17, 2016
  7. Duy NguyenJul 17, 2016
  8. brian m. carlsonJul 17, 2016
  9. Theodore Ts'oJul 17, 2016
  10. brian m. carlsonJul 17, 2016
  11. Junio C HamanoJul 18, 2016
  12. Jonathan NiederJul 18, 2016
  13. brian m. carlsonJul 18, 2016
  14. Johannes SchindelinJul 21, 2016
  15. Johannes SchindelinJul 21, 2016
  16. Junio C HamanoJul 22, 2016
  17. Johannes SchindelinJul 18, 2016
  18. brian m. carlsonJul 18, 2016
  19. Johannes SchindelinJul 21, 2016
  20. Duy NguyenJul 18, 2016
  21. Johannes SchindelinJul 19, 2016
  22. David LangJul 19, 2016
  23. Duy NguyenJul 19, 2016
  24. Junio C HamanoJul 19, 2016
  25. Duy NguyenJul 19, 2016
  26. Junio C HamanoJul 19, 2016
  27. Ævar Arnfjörð BjarmasonJul 18, 2016
  28. Herczeg ZsoltJul 18, 2016
  29. Ævar Arnfjörð BjarmasonJul 18, 2016
  30. Junio C HamanoJul 18, 2016
  31. Herczeg ZsoltJul 18, 2016
  32. David LangJul 18, 2016
  33. Fwd: Git and SHA-1 security (again)Herczeg Zsolt, Jul 18, 2016
  34. Johannes SchindelinJul 18, 2016
  35. Herczeg ZsoltJul 18, 2016
  36. Johannes SchindelinJul 18, 2016
  37. Duy NguyenJul 18, 2016
  38. Johannes SchindelinJul 19, 2016
  39. Duy NguyenJul 19, 2016
  40. David LangJul 19, 2016
  41. Duy NguyenJul 19, 2016
  42. David LangJul 19, 2016
  43. Duy NguyenJul 19, 2016
  44. Herczeg ZsoltJul 19, 2016
  45. Duy NguyenJul 20, 2016
  46. Johannes SchindelinJul 20, 2016
  47. Duy NguyenJul 20, 2016
  48. Stefan BellerJul 20, 2016
  49. Junio C HamanoJul 20, 2016
  50. Philip OakleyAug 22, 2016
  51. Herczeg ZsoltJul 18, 2016
  52. Johannes SchindelinJul 19, 2016

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