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Re: Git and SHA-1 security (again)

From
Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
Date
Jul 21, 2016, 13:19 UTC
Message-ID
<alpine.DEB.2.20.1607211454061.14111@virtualbox>
In-Reply-To
<20160718230324.GG6644@vauxhall.crustytoothpaste.net>
Hi Brian,
On Mon, 18 Jul 2016, brian m. carlson wrote:
Show 13 quoted lines
> On Mon, Jul 18, 2016 at 11:00:35AM -0700, Junio C Hamano wrote:
> > Continuing this thought process, I do not see a good way to allow us
> > to wean ourselves off of the old hash, unless we _break_ the pack
> > stream format so that each object in the pack carries not just the
> > data but also the hash algorithm to be used to _name_ it, so that
> > new objects will never be referred to using the old hash.
> 
> I think for this reason, I'm going to propose the following approach
> when we get there:
> 
> * We serialize the hash in the object formats, using multihash or
>   something similar.  This means that it is minimally painful if we ever
>   need to change in the future[0].

This adds a lot of redundancy, though, and has an adverse performance impact, no?

Could we not simply require packs to identify the used hash *once*, and use a single hash algorithm per repository?

That would mean that we would have to re-hash packs on-the-fly if, say, talking to a SHA-1 remote from a SHA-256 local repository.

> * Each repository carries exactly one hash algorithm, except for
>   submodule data.  If we don't do this, then some people will never
>   switch because the submodules they depend on haven't.

If we re-hash transparently, we could get away with SHA-256 even for submodules.

Show 11 quoted lines
> * If people on the new format need to refer to submodule commits using
>   SHA-1, then they have to use a prefix on the hash form; otherwise,
>   they can use the raw hash value (without any multihash prefix).
> * git fsck verifies one consistent algorithm (excepting submodule
>   references).
> 
> This preserves the security benefits, avoids future-proofing problems,
> and minimizes performance impacts due to naming like you mentioned.
> 
> [0] We are practically limited to 256-bit hashes because anything longer
> will wrap on an 80-column terminal when in hex form.

We are not really bound by the 80-column limit when choosing a hash algorithm. We typically refer to a commit by a shorter name, and the 80-column limit applies only to Git's own source code.

Ciao, Dscho

Previous: brian m. carlsonNext: Johannes Schindelin
Message 14 of 52 in “Git and SHA-1 security (again)”
  1. Herczeg ZsoltJul 16, 2016
  2. brian m. carlsonJul 16, 2016
  3. Herczeg ZsoltJul 16, 2016
  4. brian m. carlsonJul 16, 2016
  5. Johannes SchindelinJul 17, 2016
  6. brian m. carlsonJul 17, 2016
  7. Duy NguyenJul 17, 2016
  8. brian m. carlsonJul 17, 2016
  9. Theodore Ts'oJul 17, 2016
  10. brian m. carlsonJul 17, 2016
  11. Junio C HamanoJul 18, 2016
  12. Jonathan NiederJul 18, 2016
  13. brian m. carlsonJul 18, 2016
  14. Johannes SchindelinJul 21, 2016
  15. Johannes SchindelinJul 21, 2016
  16. Junio C HamanoJul 22, 2016
  17. Johannes SchindelinJul 18, 2016
  18. brian m. carlsonJul 18, 2016
  19. Johannes SchindelinJul 21, 2016
  20. Duy NguyenJul 18, 2016
  21. Johannes SchindelinJul 19, 2016
  22. David LangJul 19, 2016
  23. Duy NguyenJul 19, 2016
  24. Junio C HamanoJul 19, 2016
  25. Duy NguyenJul 19, 2016
  26. Junio C HamanoJul 19, 2016
  27. Ævar Arnfjörð BjarmasonJul 18, 2016
  28. Herczeg ZsoltJul 18, 2016
  29. Ævar Arnfjörð BjarmasonJul 18, 2016
  30. Junio C HamanoJul 18, 2016
  31. Herczeg ZsoltJul 18, 2016
  32. David LangJul 18, 2016
  33. Fwd: Git and SHA-1 security (again)Herczeg Zsolt, Jul 18, 2016
  34. Johannes SchindelinJul 18, 2016
  35. Herczeg ZsoltJul 18, 2016
  36. Johannes SchindelinJul 18, 2016
  37. Duy NguyenJul 18, 2016
  38. Johannes SchindelinJul 19, 2016
  39. Duy NguyenJul 19, 2016
  40. David LangJul 19, 2016
  41. Duy NguyenJul 19, 2016
  42. David LangJul 19, 2016
  43. Duy NguyenJul 19, 2016
  44. Herczeg ZsoltJul 19, 2016
  45. Duy NguyenJul 20, 2016
  46. Johannes SchindelinJul 20, 2016
  47. Duy NguyenJul 20, 2016
  48. Stefan BellerJul 20, 2016
  49. Junio C HamanoJul 20, 2016
  50. Philip OakleyAug 22, 2016
  51. Herczeg ZsoltJul 18, 2016
  52. Johannes SchindelinJul 19, 2016

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