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Re: Git and SHA-1 security (again)

From
Duy Nguyen <pclouds@gmail.com>
Date
Jul 19, 2016, 15:31 UTC
Message-ID
<CACsJy8CSUu=AemQ-7uxth_2M=ko_KDGsdObwYdiE=L4OMKcVZw@mail.gmail.com>
In-Reply-To
<alpine.DEB.2.20.1607190910370.3472@virtualbox>

On Tue, Jul 19, 2016 at 9:18 AM, Johannes Schindelin <Johannes.Schindelin@gmx.de> wrote:

Show 10 quoted lines
>> But we can recreate SHA-1 from the same content and verify GPG, right?
>> I know it's super expensive, but it feels safer to not carry SHA-1
>> around when it's not secure anymore (I recall something about
>> exploiting the weakest link when you have both sha1 and sha256 in the
>> object content). Rehashing would be done locally and is better
>> controlled.
>
> You could. But how would you determine whether to recreate the commit
> object from a SHA-1-ified version of the commit buffer? Fall back if the
> original did not match the signature?

Any repo would have a cut point when they move to sha256 (or whatever new hash), if we can record this somewhere (e.g. as a tag or a bunch of tags, or some dummy commits to mark the heads of the repo) then we only verify gpg signatures _in_ the repository before this point.

Show 10 quoted lines
> That would pose at least these two problems:
>
> 1. The point of a signature is trust. If all of a sudden the signature
> does not match what is supposedly signed, that trust is broken.
>
> 2. The point of going to a stronger hash is to increase the trust. If
> any developer could decide to sign the SHA-1-ified version of any future
> commit, and Git validating it, it would be even worse than not switching
> to a new hash: it would leave us open to collision attacks *and* pretend
> that we prevented such attacks.

GPG signatures are still valid on the old repo (we will keep old repos around forever, I suppose). And because they sign on the "weak" hash, sha1, at some point they will be broken (but until then we can still regenerate sha1 and verify locally). When sha1 is broken, GPG signatures of the past can't be trusted anymore.

If people care enough about the past, they should re-sign (at least for tags). Commits can be re-signed by the person who does the conversion. Yes you have to trust that person. Sort of a painful fresh start, with hopefully better security.

-- 
Duy
Previous: Johannes SchindelinNext: David Lang
Message 39 of 52 in “Git and SHA-1 security (again)”
  1. Herczeg ZsoltJul 16, 2016
  2. brian m. carlsonJul 16, 2016
  3. Herczeg ZsoltJul 16, 2016
  4. brian m. carlsonJul 16, 2016
  5. Johannes SchindelinJul 17, 2016
  6. brian m. carlsonJul 17, 2016
  7. Duy NguyenJul 17, 2016
  8. brian m. carlsonJul 17, 2016
  9. Theodore Ts'oJul 17, 2016
  10. brian m. carlsonJul 17, 2016
  11. Junio C HamanoJul 18, 2016
  12. Jonathan NiederJul 18, 2016
  13. brian m. carlsonJul 18, 2016
  14. Johannes SchindelinJul 21, 2016
  15. Johannes SchindelinJul 21, 2016
  16. Junio C HamanoJul 22, 2016
  17. Johannes SchindelinJul 18, 2016
  18. brian m. carlsonJul 18, 2016
  19. Johannes SchindelinJul 21, 2016
  20. Duy NguyenJul 18, 2016
  21. Johannes SchindelinJul 19, 2016
  22. David LangJul 19, 2016
  23. Duy NguyenJul 19, 2016
  24. Junio C HamanoJul 19, 2016
  25. Duy NguyenJul 19, 2016
  26. Junio C HamanoJul 19, 2016
  27. Ævar Arnfjörð BjarmasonJul 18, 2016
  28. Herczeg ZsoltJul 18, 2016
  29. Ævar Arnfjörð BjarmasonJul 18, 2016
  30. Junio C HamanoJul 18, 2016
  31. Herczeg ZsoltJul 18, 2016
  32. David LangJul 18, 2016
  33. Fwd: Git and SHA-1 security (again)Herczeg Zsolt, Jul 18, 2016
  34. Johannes SchindelinJul 18, 2016
  35. Herczeg ZsoltJul 18, 2016
  36. Johannes SchindelinJul 18, 2016
  37. Duy NguyenJul 18, 2016
  38. Johannes SchindelinJul 19, 2016
  39. Duy NguyenJul 19, 2016
  40. David LangJul 19, 2016
  41. Duy NguyenJul 19, 2016
  42. David LangJul 19, 2016
  43. Duy NguyenJul 19, 2016
  44. Herczeg ZsoltJul 19, 2016
  45. Duy NguyenJul 20, 2016
  46. Johannes SchindelinJul 20, 2016
  47. Duy NguyenJul 20, 2016
  48. Stefan BellerJul 20, 2016
  49. Junio C HamanoJul 20, 2016
  50. Philip OakleyAug 22, 2016
  51. Herczeg ZsoltJul 18, 2016
  52. Johannes SchindelinJul 19, 2016

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