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Re: [PATCH 14/16] promisor-remote: trust known remotes matching acceptFromServerUrl

From
Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
Date
Mar 23, 2026, 18:54 UTC
Message-ID
<xmqqzf3y4bsg.fsf@gitster.g>
In-Reply-To
<20260323080520.887550-15-christian.couder@gmail.com>
Christian Couder <christian.couder@gmail.com> writes:
Show 13 quoted lines
> diff --git a/Documentation/config/promisor.adoc b/Documentation/config/promisor.adoc
> index b0fa43b839..6f5442cd65 100644
> --- a/Documentation/config/promisor.adoc
> +++ b/Documentation/config/promisor.adoc
> @@ -51,6 +51,52 @@ promisor.acceptFromServer::
>  	to "fetch" and "clone" requests from the client. Name and URL
>  	comparisons are case sensitive. See linkgit:gitprotocol-v2[5].
>  
> +promisor.acceptFromServerUrl::
> +	A glob pattern to specify which URLs advertised by a server
> +	are considered trusted by the client. This option acts as an
> +	additive security whitelist that works in conjunction with
> +	`promisor.acceptFromServer`.

Between the first sentence and the second one, I think there needs to be an explanation on what "trusted" means in this context. Is it trusted so that the URL can feed random configuration variable=value pairs for the client to blindly apply? Or is it trusted to do very limited things that other remotes can do, and if so what are these limited things? Without knowing that, the end-users cannot assess the security implications of setting this option.

I am guessing that the client would behave as if the existing promisor.acceptFromServer configuration variable were set to "all" when talking with a remote whose URL matches one of the patterns listed?

By the way, some people may suggest "white" -> "allow".
> +1. Start with a secure protocol scheme, like `https://` or `ssh://`.

Is there a practical reason why people would want to use schemes other than the above two? This sounds like something a small amount of code can easily enforce.

> +2. Only allow domain names or paths where you control and trust _ALL_
> +   the content.
Obviously.
> +3. Don't use globs (`*`) in the domain name. For example
> +   `https://cdn.example.com/*` is much safer than
> +   `https://*.example.com/*`, because the latter matches
> +   `https://evil-hacker.net/fake.example.com/repo`.

Is there a practical use case where allowing '*' to match anything that contains a slash '/' is useful?

> +4. Make sure to have a `/` at the end of the domain name (or the end
> +   of specific directories). For example `https://cdn.example.com/*`
> +   is much safer than `https://cdn.example.com*`, because the latter
> +   matches `https://cdn.example.com.hacker.net/repo`.

Ditto. The above two points sound like excuses to keep sloppy asterisk matching logic. Yes, retroactively tightening rules always have risk to break existing deployments, but if existing code paths of urlmatch do not have any good reason to allow '*' to match a string that contains a slash '/', perhaps there is no fallout.

Previous: Christian CouderNext: Junio C Hamano
Message 35 of 47 in “Auto-configure advertised remotes via URL whitelist”
  1. 00/16 Auto-configure advertised remotes via URL whitelistChristian Couder, Mar 23, 2026
  2. 01/16 promisor-remote: try accepted remotes before others in get_direct()Christian Couder, Mar 23, 2026
  3. Patrick SteinhardtMar 26, 2026
  4. Christian CouderApr 2, 2026
  5. 02/16 urlmatch: change 'allow_globs' arg to boolChristian Couder, Mar 23, 2026
  6. 03/16 urlmatch: add url_is_valid_pattern() helperChristian Couder, Mar 23, 2026
  7. Patrick SteinhardtMar 26, 2026
  8. Christian CouderApr 27, 2026
  9. 04/16 promisor-remote: clarify that a remote is ignoredChristian Couder, Mar 23, 2026
  10. Patrick SteinhardtMar 26, 2026
  11. Christian CouderApr 2, 2026
  12. 05/16 promisor-remote: refactor has_control_char()Christian Couder, Mar 23, 2026
  13. 06/16 promisor-remote: refactor accept_from_server()Christian Couder, Mar 23, 2026
  14. 07/16 promisor-remote: keep accepted promisor_info structs aliveChristian Couder, Mar 23, 2026
  15. Patrick SteinhardtMar 26, 2026
  16. 08/16 promisor-remote: remove the 'accepted' strvecChristian Couder, Mar 23, 2026
  17. Patrick SteinhardtMar 26, 2026
  18. Christian CouderApr 2, 2026
  19. 09/16 promisor-remote: add 'local_name' to 'struct promisor_info'Christian Couder, Mar 23, 2026
  20. Patrick SteinhardtMar 26, 2026
  21. Christian CouderApr 27, 2026
  22. 10/16 promisor-remote: pass config entry to all_fields_match() directlyChristian Couder, Mar 23, 2026
  23. Patrick SteinhardtMar 26, 2026
  24. Christian CouderApr 2, 2026
  25. 12/16 t5710: use proper file:// URIs for absolute pathsChristian Couder, Mar 23, 2026
  26. Patrick SteinhardtMar 26, 2026
  27. Christian CouderApr 2, 2026
  28. 13/16 promisor-remote: introduce promisor.acceptFromServerUrlChristian Couder, Mar 23, 2026
  29. Patrick SteinhardtMar 26, 2026
  30. Christian CouderApr 27, 2026
  31. 11/16 promisor-remote: refactor should_accept_remote() control flowChristian Couder, Mar 23, 2026
  32. Patrick SteinhardtMar 26, 2026
  33. Christian CouderApr 2, 2026
  34. 14/16 promisor-remote: trust known remotes matching acceptFromServerUrlChristian Couder, Mar 23, 2026
  35. Junio C HamanoMar 23, 2026
  36. Junio C HamanoMar 23, 2026
  37. Christian CouderMar 27, 2026
  38. Junio C HamanoMar 31, 2026
  39. Christian CouderApr 1, 2026
  40. Patrick SteinhardtMar 26, 2026
  41. Christian CouderApr 27, 2026
  42. 16/16 doc: promisor: improve acceptFromServer entryChristian Couder, Mar 23, 2026
  43. 15/16 promisor-remote: auto-configure unknown remotesChristian Couder, Mar 23, 2026
  44. Patrick SteinhardtMar 26, 2026
  45. Christian CouderApr 27, 2026
  46. Patrick SteinhardtMar 26, 2026
  47. Christian CouderApr 2, 2026

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