Re: [PATCH 14/16] promisor-remote: trust known remotes matching acceptFromServerUrl
- From
Christian Couder <christian.couder@gmail.com>
- Date
- Apr 27, 2026, 12:45 UTC
- Message-ID
- <CAP8UFD1dvys9nEF6tRudWaeHmmEFH0NGPqK5YM_mk5RQa2=ujw@mail.gmail.com>
- In-Reply-To
- <acUk0vTuj8COlvgf@pks.im>
On Thu, Mar 26, 2026 at 1:21 PM Patrick Steinhardt <ps@pks.im> wrote:
> > On Mon, Mar 23, 2026 at 09:05:17AM +0100, Christian Couder wrote:
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> > To enable such targeted updates for trusted URLs, let's use the URL > > patterns from `promisor.acceptFromServerUrl` as an additional URL > > based whitelist. > > > > Concretely, let's check the advertised URLs against the URL glob > > patterns by introducing a new small helper function called > > url_matches_accept_list(), which iterates over the glob patterns and > > returns the first matching allowed_url entry (or NULL). > > > > (Before matching, the advertised URL is passed through url_normalize() > > so that case variations in the scheme/host, percent-encoding tricks, > > and ".." path segments cannot bypass the whitelist.) > > > > Let's then use this helper at the tail of should_accept_remote() so > > that, when `accept == ACCEPT_NONE`, a known remote whose URL matches > > the whitelist is still accepted. > > > > To prepare for this new logic, let's also: > > > > - Add an 'accept_urls' parameter to should_accept_remote(). > > > > - Replace the BUG() guard in the ACCEPT_KNOWN_URL case with an > > explicit 'if (accept == ACCEPT_KNOWN_URL) return' and a new > > BUG() guard in the ACCEPT_NONE case, so url_matches_accept_list() > > is only called in the ACCEPT_NONE case. > > > > - Call accept_from_server_url() from filter_promisor_remote() > > and relax its early return so that the function is entered when > > `accept_urls` has entries even if `accept == ACCEPT_NONE`. > > > > Let's then properly document `promisor.acceptFromServerUrl` in > > "promisor.adoc" as an additive security whitelist for known remotes, > > including the URL normalization behavior, and let's mention it in > > "gitprotocol-v2.adoc". > > I feel like the description is steering a bit too strongly into the > direction of a step-by-step instruction of how to implement the change > rather than explaining what's done and why it's done this way.
I have added the following:
"With this, many organizations may only need something like:
git config set --global \
promisor.acceptFromServerUrl "https://my-org.com/*"to accept only their own remotes. And if they need to accept additional remotes in some specific repos, they can also set:
git config set promisor.acceptFromServer knownUrl
and configure the additional remote manually only in the repos where they are needed."
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> > +promisor.acceptFromServerUrl:: > > + A glob pattern to specify which URLs advertised by a server > > + are considered trusted by the client. This option acts as an > > + additive security whitelist that works in conjunction with > > + `promisor.acceptFromServer`. > > ++ > > +This option can appear multiple times in config files. An advertised > > +URL will be accepted if it matches _ANY_ glob pattern specified by > > +this option in _ANY_ config file read by Git. > > ++ > > +Be _VERY_ careful with these glob patterns, as it can be a big > > +security hole to allow any advertised remote to be auto-configured! > > +To minimize security risks, follow these guidelines: > > ++ > > +1. Start with a secure protocol scheme, like `https://` or `ssh://`. > > ++ > > +2. Only allow domain names or paths where you control and trust _ALL_ > > + the content. Be especially careful with shared hosting platforms > > + like `github.com` or `gitlab.com`. A broad pattern like > > + `https://gitlab.com/*` is dangerous because it trusts every > > + repository on the entire platform. Always restrict such patterns to > > + your specific organization or namespace (e.g., > > + `https://gitlab.com/your-org/*`). > > ++ > > +3. Don't use globs (`*`) in the domain name. For example > > + `https://cdn.example.com/*` is much safer than > > + `https://*.example.com/*`, because the latter matches > > + `https://evil-hacker.net/fake.example.com/repo`. > > ++ > > +4. Make sure to have a `/` at the end of the domain name (or the end > > + of specific directories). For example `https://cdn.example.com/*` > > + is much safer than `https://cdn.example.com*`, because the latter > > + matches `https://cdn.example.com.hacker.net/repo`. > > ++ > > +Before matching, the advertised URL is normalized: the scheme and > > +host are lowercased, percent-encoded characters are decoded where > > +possible, and path segments like `..` are resolved. Glob patterns > > +are matched against this normalized URL as-is, so patterns should > > +be written in normalized form (e.g., lowercase scheme and host). > > ++ > > +Even if `promisor.acceptFromServer` is set to `None` (the default), > > +Git will still accept field updates (like tokens) for known remotes, > > +provided their URLs match a pattern in > > +`promisor.acceptFromServerUrl`. See linkgit:gitprotocol-v2[5] for > > +details on the protocol. > > Given that there's a bunch to process here, would it make sense to give > users an example for how to do it properly?
I can give an example like the one I added to the commit message (see above), but it might be too lax for some use cases. Perhaps in many organizations only a single repo will ever require to accept promisor remotes, so giving an example with the `--global` flag like:
git config set --global promisor.acceptFromServerUrl "https://my-org.com/*"
could make everyone's config a bit more vulnerable than necessary.
I think it's better to nudge people to think through the four steps above, rather than to encourage them to copy-paste something that might not be very well suited to their needs.
> I also wonder why we require a new config entry instead of extending > `promisor.acceptFromRemote` to have for example a new "url:https://..." > setting. Are there cases where you would ever want to use the new > URL-based schema with a different setting than "all"?
Yes, I think the example in the commit message shows why having both:
- `promisor.acceptFromRemote` that you can set for example to "knownUrl" only in some specific repos where you accept external promisor remotes that you configure manually, and
- `promisor.acceptFromRemoteUrl` that you can set for example to "https://my-org.com/*" globally
can be relatively simple and quite powerful:
- all internal remotes (with URLs in https://my-org.com/) are automatically accepted in all the repos, - in certain specific repos, some external remotes (with names and URLs that are manually configured in the repos) are also accepted.
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> I guess the case with "none" is exactly that, where you may auto-update > configured remotes. But I wonder whether it would be more sensible to > split out behaviour of accepting and updating promisors into separate > configuration variables. These are ultimately different concerns, and > the interaction as layed out in this commit is somewhat non-obvious to > me.
Let me know if there are things I could clarify more in the above explanations. I am also open to concrete suggestions.
Thanks.