Re: [PATCH v2] Add commit, tag & push signing/verification via SSH keys using ssh-keygen

>> +		sigc->result = 'G';
>> +		sigc->trust_level = TRUST_FULLY;
>> +
>> +		next = strchrnul(output, ' '); // 'principal'
>> +		replace_cstring(&sigc->signer, output, next);
>> +		output = next + 1;
>> +		next = strchrnul(output, ' '); // 'with'
>> +		output = next + 1;
>> +		next = strchrnul(output, ' '); // KEY Type
>> +		output = next + 1;
>> +		next = strchrnul(output, ' '); // 'key'
>> +		output = next + 1;
> FWIW for new code we'd probably use string_list_split() or
> string_list_split_in_place() or strbuf_split_buf() or something, but I
> see this is following the existing pattern in the file...

>> +	const char *payload, size_t payload_size,
>> +	const char *signature, size_t signature_size)
>>   {
>> -	struct child_process gpg = CHILD_PROCESS_INIT;
>> -	struct gpg_format *fmt;
>> +	struct child_process ssh_keygen = CHILD_PROCESS_INIT;
>>   	struct tempfile *temp;
>>   	int ret;
>> -	struct strbuf buf = STRBUF_INIT;
>> +	const char *line;
>> +	size_t trust_size;
>> +	char *principal;
>> +	struct strbuf ssh_keygen_out = STRBUF_INIT;
>> +	struct strbuf ssh_keygen_err = STRBUF_INIT;
>>   
>>   	temp = mks_tempfile_t(".git_vtag_tmpXXXXXX");
>>   	if (!temp)
>> @@ -279,29 +342,125 @@ static int verify_signed_buffer(const char *payload, size_t payload_size,
>>   		return -1;
>>   	}
>>   
>> -	fmt = get_format_by_sig(signature);
>> -	if (!fmt)
>> -		BUG("bad signature '%s'", signature);
>> +	// Find the principal from the  signers
>> +	strvec_pushl(&ssh_keygen.args,  fmt->program,
>> +					"-Y", "find-principals",
>> +					"-f", get_ssh_allowed_signers(),
>> +					"-s", temp->filename.buf,
>> +					NULL);
>> +	ret = pipe_command(&ssh_keygen, NULL, 0, &ssh_keygen_out, 0, &ssh_keygen_err, 0);
>> +	if (strstr(ssh_keygen_err.buf, "unknown option")) {
>> +		error(_("openssh version > 8.2p1 is needed for ssh signature verification (ssh-keygen needs -Y find-principals/verify option)"));
>> +	}
>> +	if (ret || !ssh_keygen_out.len) {
>> +		// We did not find a matching principal in the keyring - Check without validation
>> +		child_process_init(&ssh_keygen);
>> +		strvec_pushl(&ssh_keygen.args,  fmt->program,
>> +						"-Y", "check-novalidate",
>> +						"-n", "git",
>> +						"-s", temp->filename.buf,
>> +						NULL);
>> +		ret = pipe_command(&ssh_keygen, payload, payload_size, &ssh_keygen_out, 0, &ssh_keygen_err, 0);
>> +	} else {
>> +		// Check every principal we found (one per line)
>> +		for (line = ssh_keygen_out.buf; *line; line = strchrnul(line + 1, '\n')) {
> Hrm, can't we use strbuf_getline() here with the underlying io_pump API
> that pipe_command() uses, instead of slurping it all up, and then
> splitting on '\n' ourselves? (I'm not sure)

>> +			while (*line == '\n')
>> +				line++;
>> +			if (!*line)
>> +				break;
>> +
>> +			trust_size = strcspn(line, " \n");
>> +			principal = xmemdupz(line, trust_size);
>> +
>> +			child_process_init(&ssh_keygen);
>> +			strbuf_release(&ssh_keygen_out);
>> +			strbuf_release(&ssh_keygen_err);
>> +			strvec_push(&ssh_keygen.args,fmt->program);
>> +			// We found principals - Try with each until we find a match
>> +			strvec_pushl(&ssh_keygen.args,  "-Y", "verify",
>> +							//TODO: sprintf("-Overify-time=%s", commit->date...),
>> +							"-n", "git",
>> +							"-f", get_ssh_allowed_signers(),
>> +							"-I", principal,
>> +							"-s", temp->filename.buf,
>> +							NULL);
>> +
>> +			if (ssh_revocation_file && file_exists(ssh_revocation_file)) {
>> +				strvec_pushl(&ssh_keygen.args, "-r", ssh_revocation_file, NULL);
> Do we want to silently ignore missing but configured revocation files?

>
>> +			}
>> +
>> +			sigchain_push(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN);
>> +			ret = pipe_command(&ssh_keygen, payload, payload_size,
>> +					&ssh_keygen_out, 0, &ssh_keygen_err, 0);
>> +			sigchain_pop(SIGPIPE);
>> +
>> +			ret &= starts_with(ssh_keygen_out.buf, "Good");
>> +			if (ret == 0)
>> +				break;
>> +		}
>> +	}
>> +
>> +	sigc->payload = xmemdupz(payload, payload_size);
>> +	strbuf_stripspace(&ssh_keygen_out, 0);
>> +	strbuf_stripspace(&ssh_keygen_err, 0);
>> +	strbuf_add(&ssh_keygen_out, ssh_keygen_err.buf, ssh_keygen_err.len);
>> +	sigc->output = strbuf_detach(&ssh_keygen_out, NULL);
>> +
>> +	//sigc->gpg_output = strbuf_detach(&ssh_keygen_err, NULL); // This flip around is broken...
> Broken how? And why the commented-out code as part of the patch?

>
>> -	status = verify_signed_buffer(payload, plen, signature, slen,
>> -				      &gpg_output, &gpg_status);
>> -	if (status && !gpg_output.len)
>> -		goto out;
>> -	sigc->payload = xmemdupz(payload, plen);
>> -	sigc->gpg_output = strbuf_detach(&gpg_output, NULL);
>> -	sigc->gpg_status = strbuf_detach(&gpg_status, NULL);
>> -	parse_gpg_output(sigc);
>> +	fmt = get_format_by_sig(signature);
>> +	if (!fmt)
>> +		BUG("bad signature '%s'", signature);
> So if we run this from receive-pack or whatever we'll BUG() out? I.e. I
> think this should be an fsck check or something, but not a BUG(), or
> does this not rely on potentially bad object-store state?

>
>> +static char *get_ssh_key_fingerprint(const char *signing_key) {
>> +	struct child_process ssh_keygen = CHILD_PROCESS_INIT;
>> +	int ret = -1;
>> +	struct strbuf fingerprint_stdout = STRBUF_INIT;
>> +	struct strbuf **fingerprint;
>> +
>> +	/* For SSH Signing this can contain a filename or a public key
>> +	* For textual representation we usually want a fingerprint
>> +	*/
>> +	if (istarts_with(signing_key, "ssh-")) {
>> +		strvec_pushl(&ssh_keygen.args, "ssh-keygen",
>> +					"-lf", "-",
>> +					NULL);
>> +		ret = pipe_command(&ssh_keygen, signing_key, strlen(signing_key), &fingerprint_stdout, 0,  NULL, 0);
>> +	} else {
>> +		strvec_pushl(&ssh_keygen.args, "ssh-keygen",
>> +					"-lf", configured_signing_key,
>> +					NULL);
>> +		ret = pipe_command(&ssh_keygen, NULL, 0, &fingerprint_stdout, 0, NULL, 0);
>> +		if (!!ret)
>> +			die_errno(_("failed to get the ssh fingerprint for key '%s'"), signing_key);
>> +		fingerprint = strbuf_split_max(&fingerprint_stdout, ' ', 3);
>> +		if (fingerprint[1]) {
>> +			return strbuf_detach(fingerprint[1], NULL);
>> +		}
>> +	}
>> +	die_errno(_("failed to get the ssh fingerprint for key '%s'"), signing_key);
>> +}
> Her you declare a ret that's not used at all in the "istarts_with"
> branch, and we fall through to die_errno()?

>
> [I stopped reading mostly at this point]
>
>> [...]
>> +# test_expect_success GPGSSH 'detect fudged commit with double signature' '
>> +# 	sed -e "/gpgsig/,/END PGP/d" forged1 >double-base &&
>> +# 	sed -n -e "/gpgsig/,/END PGP/p" forged1 | \
>> +# 		sed -e "s/^$(test_oid header)//;s/^ //" | gpg --dearmor >double-sig1.sig &&
>> +# 	gpg -o double-sig2.sig -u 29472784 --detach-sign double-base &&
>> +# 	cat double-sig1.sig double-sig2.sig | gpg --enarmor >double-combined.asc &&
>> +# 	sed -e "s/^\(-.*\)ARMORED FILE/\1SIGNATURE/;1s/^/$(test_oid header) /;2,\$s/^/ /" \
>> +# 		double-combined.asc > double-gpgsig &&
>> +# 	sed -e "/committer/r double-gpgsig" double-base >double-commit &&
>> +# 	git hash-object -w -t commit double-commit >double-commit.commit &&
>> +# 	test_must_fail git verify-commit $(cat double-commit.commit) &&
>> +# 	git show --pretty=short --show-signature $(cat double-commit.commit) >double-actual &&
>> +# 	grep "BAD signature from" double-actual &&
>> +# 	grep "Good signature from" double-actual
>> +# '
>> +
>> +# test_expect_success GPGSSH 'show double signature with custom format' '
>> +# 	cat >expect <<-\EOF &&
>> +# 	E
>> +
>> +
>> +
>> +
>> +# 	EOF
>> +# 	git log -1 --format="%G?%n%GK%n%GS%n%GF%n%GP" $(cat double-commit.commit) >actual &&
>> +# 	test_cmp expect actual
>> +# '
> Perhaps you're looking for test_expect_failure for TODO tests?