git/list[1] front-page[2] threads[3] people[4] search[5] about
 

Re: [PATCH v2 2/2] imap-send: let OpenSSL do the hostname verification

From
Patrick Steinhardt <ps@pks.im>
Date
Oct 13, 2026, 13:14 UTC
Message-ID
<as4uwMflv6qzcoTh@pks.im>
In-Reply-To
<20261012203057.969878-2-dev+git@drbeat.li>
On Mon, Oct 12, 2026 at 10:30:57PM +0200, Beat Bolli wrote:
> According to the OpenSSL Wiki[1], OpenSSL knows how to verify the peer's
> hostname since version 1.0.2. A simpler interface is available since
> 1.1.0, which is what is implemented here.

What is implicit here is that Git performs its own hostname verification. A short introduction explaining the status quo and why the status quo is insufficient would help the reviewer.

What's also missing is a quick note on the minimum supported version of OpenSSL.

> As a side-effect, we get all present and future improvements done by
> OpenSSL for free. E.g., the old code did not handle IP addresses in the
> subject alternative names, while the new code does.
That sounds like it's win-win: less code and more supported scenarios!
Show 10 quoted lines
> If the verification fails, print the error message as returned by
> OpenSSL.
> 
> [1]: https://wiki.openssl.org/index.php/Hostname_validation
> 
> Suggested-by: brian m. carlson <sandals@crustytoothpaste.net>
> Signed-off-by: Beat Bolli <dev+git@drbeat.li>
> ---
>  imap-send.c | 86 +++++++++--------------------------------------------
>  1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 72 deletions(-)

Don't we have any tests for this? If not, can we maybe add some to make sure that we indeed still verify the hostname?

Show 10 quoted lines
> diff --git a/imap-send.c b/imap-send.c
> index 9f21705d77..cd9eae15d0 100644
> --- a/imap-send.c
> +++ b/imap-send.c
> @@ -325,6 +261,15 @@ static int ssl_socket_connect(struct imap_socket *sock,
>  		ssl_socket_perror("SSL_new");
>  		return -1;
>  	}
> +	if (cfg->ssl_verify) {
> +		SSL_set_hostflags(sock->ssl, X509_CHECK_FLAG_NO_PARTIAL_WILDCARDS);

This matches the documentation, but it also points out the X509_CHECK_FLAG_NO_WILDCARDS as a second commonly used flag. Why do we pick one over the other?

Show 17 quoted lines
> @@ -352,14 +297,11 @@ static int ssl_socket_connect(struct imap_socket *sock,
>  	}
>  
>  	if (cfg->ssl_verify) {
> -		/* make sure the hostname matches that of the certificate */
> -		cert = SSL_get_peer_certificate(sock->ssl);
> -		if (!cert)
> -			return error("unable to get peer certificate.");
> -		if (SSL_get_verify_result(sock->ssl) != X509_V_OK)
> -			return error("unable to verify peer certificate");
> -		if (verify_hostname(cert, cfg->host) < 0)
> -			return -1;
> +		/* make sure the certificate was verified */
> +		long res = SSL_get_verify_result(sock->ssl);
> +		if (res != X509_V_OK)
> +			return error("unable to verify peer certificate: %s",
> +				     X509_verify_cert_error_string(res));
Wait, this feels fishy to me. Take the following from [1]:
  In other cases where no peer certificate or raw public key was
  presented, the returned result can still be X509_V_OK, for example
  when a server did not request a client certificate during the initial
  handshake. X509_V_OK alone does not establish how or whether the peer
  was authenticated. A suitably provisioned external PSK can
  authenticate a peer without a certificate or raw public key. When
  certificate or raw public key authentication is expected, applications
  must also check that the expected credential is present using
  SSL_get_peer_certificate(3) or SSL_get0_peer_rpk(3).

So this here basically allows for a MITM attack in case the intercepting adversary simply strips the certificate altogether if I understand correctly. And to fix that we must retain the call to `SSL_get_peer_certificate()`.

That makes me want to have tests even more now.
[1]: https://docs.openssl.org/4.1/man3/SSL_get_verify_result/#bugs
Patrick
Previous: Xiangfei Ding
Message 23 of 23 in “imap-send: future proofing and two correctness fixes”
  1. 0/3 imap-send: future proofing and two correctness fixesBeat Bolli, Sep 7, 2026
  2. 3/3 imap-send: only check the CN if no SAN DNS names are presentBeat Bolli, Sep 7, 2026
  3. brian m. carlsonSep 8, 2026
  4. 2/3 imap-send: don't expect an ASN1_STRING to be NUL-terminatedBeat Bolli, Sep 7, 2026
  5. Junio C HamanoSep 8, 2026
  6. Patrick SteinhardtSep 8, 2026
  7. 1/3 imap-send: prepare for OpenSSL 4.1Beat Bolli, Sep 7, 2026
  8. Junio C HamanoSep 8, 2026
  9. Patrick SteinhardtSep 8, 2026
  10. Beat BolliSep 14, 2026
  11. Patrick SteinhardtSep 23, 2026
  12. 1/2 imap-send: use the recommended TLS_method()Beat Bolli, Oct 12, 2026
  13. 1/3 imap-send: use the recommended TLS_method()Beat Bolli, Oct 17, 2026
  14. 2/3 imap-send: let OpenSSL do the hostname verificationBeat Bolli, Oct 17, 2026
  15. Patrick SteinhardtOct 19, 2026
  16. Xiangfei DingOct 19, 2026
  17. 3/3 imap-send: prepare for OpenSSL 4.0Beat Bolli, Oct 17, 2026
  18. Patrick SteinhardtOct 19, 2026
  19. Patrick SteinhardtOct 19, 2026
  20. 2/2 imap-send: let OpenSSL do the hostname verificationBeat Bolli, Oct 12, 2026
  21. Aniket GuptaOct 12, 2026
  22. Xiangfei DingOct 16, 2026
  23. Patrick SteinhardtOct 13, 2026

Read the whole thread, see it on lore, or plain text.

$ cat FOOTERMessages come from the public archive at lore.kernel.org/git, fetched every hour. The front page is chosen and written each morning by an AI editor and can be wrong; the threads themselves are the record. About and API. For agents: an MCP server at https://gitlist.dev/mcp, and any thread, story or person page as Markdown by adding .md to its URL (or sending Accept: text/markdown). Details in /llms.txt.