From: Patrick Steinhardt Date: Tue, 13 Oct 2026 13:14:40 GMT Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 2/2] imap-send: let OpenSSL do the hostname verification Message-ID: In-Reply-To: <20261012203057.969878-2-dev+git@drbeat.li> On Mon, Oct 12, 2026 at 10:30:57PM +0200, Beat Bolli wrote: > According to the OpenSSL Wiki[1], OpenSSL knows how to verify the peer's > hostname since version 1.0.2. A simpler interface is available since > 1.1.0, which is what is implemented here. What is implicit here is that Git performs its own hostname verification. A short introduction explaining the status quo and why the status quo is insufficient would help the reviewer. What's also missing is a quick note on the minimum supported version of OpenSSL. > As a side-effect, we get all present and future improvements done by > OpenSSL for free. E.g., the old code did not handle IP addresses in the > subject alternative names, while the new code does. That sounds like it's win-win: less code and more supported scenarios! > If the verification fails, print the error message as returned by > OpenSSL. > > [1]: https://wiki.openssl.org/index.php/Hostname_validation > > Suggested-by: brian m. carlson > Signed-off-by: Beat Bolli > --- > imap-send.c | 86 +++++++++-------------------------------------------- > 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 72 deletions(-) Don't we have any tests for this? If not, can we maybe add some to make sure that we indeed still verify the hostname? > diff --git a/imap-send.c b/imap-send.c > index 9f21705d77..cd9eae15d0 100644 > --- a/imap-send.c > +++ b/imap-send.c > @@ -325,6 +261,15 @@ static int ssl_socket_connect(struct imap_socket *sock, > ssl_socket_perror("SSL_new"); > return -1; > } > + if (cfg->ssl_verify) { > + SSL_set_hostflags(sock->ssl, X509_CHECK_FLAG_NO_PARTIAL_WILDCARDS); This matches the documentation, but it also points out the X509_CHECK_FLAG_NO_WILDCARDS as a second commonly used flag. Why do we pick one over the other? > @@ -352,14 +297,11 @@ static int ssl_socket_connect(struct imap_socket *sock, > } > > if (cfg->ssl_verify) { > - /* make sure the hostname matches that of the certificate */ > - cert = SSL_get_peer_certificate(sock->ssl); > - if (!cert) > - return error("unable to get peer certificate."); > - if (SSL_get_verify_result(sock->ssl) != X509_V_OK) > - return error("unable to verify peer certificate"); > - if (verify_hostname(cert, cfg->host) < 0) > - return -1; > + /* make sure the certificate was verified */ > + long res = SSL_get_verify_result(sock->ssl); > + if (res != X509_V_OK) > + return error("unable to verify peer certificate: %s", > + X509_verify_cert_error_string(res)); Wait, this feels fishy to me. Take the following from [1]: In other cases where no peer certificate or raw public key was presented, the returned result can still be X509_V_OK, for example when a server did not request a client certificate during the initial handshake. X509_V_OK alone does not establish how or whether the peer was authenticated. A suitably provisioned external PSK can authenticate a peer without a certificate or raw public key. When certificate or raw public key authentication is expected, applications must also check that the expected credential is present using SSL_get_peer_certificate(3) or SSL_get0_peer_rpk(3). So this here basically allows for a MITM attack in case the intercepting adversary simply strips the certificate altogether if I understand correctly. And to fix that we must retain the call to `SSL_get_peer_certificate()`. That makes me want to have tests even more now. [1]: https://docs.openssl.org/4.1/man3/SSL_get_verify_result/#bugs Patrick