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Re: [PATCH v3 2/3] imap-send: let OpenSSL do the hostname verification

From
XDXiangfei Ding <xfding@google.com>
Date
Oct 19, 2026, 08:44 UTC
Message-ID
<CABtdbsnrQ61eJv4GhawiFSHkN01tJhV5tYj8MNQT8F3zf3PgYw@mail.gmail.com>
In-Reply-To
<20261017100956.529225-2-dev+git@drbeat.li>
> let OpenSSL do the hostname verification
I think this is a much cleaner solution, thank you so much!
Reviewed-by: Xiangfei Ding <xfding@google.com>
On Sat, Oct 17, 2026 at 12:10 PM Beat Bolli <dev+git@drbeat.li> wrote:
Show 177 quoted lines
>
> imap-send performs its own TLS hostname verification. This is not ideal
> because it does not support all certificate features.
>
> Let's use OpenSSL built-in verification, which is supported in its
> current form since OpenSSL 1.1.0. This gets us all present and future
> improvements done by OpenSSL for free. E.g., the old code did not handle
> IP addresses in the subject alternative names, while the new code does.
>
> If the verification fails, print the error message as returned by
> OpenSSL.
>
> [1]: https://wiki.openssl.org/index.php/Hostname_validation
>
> Suggested-by: brian m. carlson <sandals@crustytoothpaste.net>
> Signed-off-by: Beat Bolli <dev+git@drbeat.li>
> ---
> We cannot easily print the certificate's hostname in case of a mismatch,
> but the cURL branch does not, either.
>
> Unfortuately, the diff looks bad because two functions are replaced by
> the new verify_peer() function that is completely unrelated.
>
>  imap-send.c | 101 +++++++++++++++++-----------------------------------
>  1 file changed, 33 insertions(+), 68 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/imap-send.c b/imap-send.c
> index 9f21705d77..ec4e28e423 100644
> --- a/imap-send.c
> +++ b/imap-send.c
> @@ -222,64 +222,30 @@ static int ssl_socket_connect(struct imap_socket *sock UNUSED,
>
>  #else
>
> -static int host_matches(const char *host, const ASN1_STRING *asn1_str)
> +static int verify_peer(const SSL *ssl, int did_connect)
>  {
> -       const char *pattern = (const char *)ASN1_STRING_get0_data(asn1_str);
> +       long verify;
>
> -       /* embedded NUL characters may open a security hole */
> -       if (memchr(pattern, '\0', ASN1_STRING_length(asn1_str)))
> -           return 0;
> -
> -       if (pattern[0] == '*' && pattern[1] == '.') {
> -               pattern += 2;
> -               if (!(host = strchr(host, '.')))
> -                       return 0;
> -               host++;
> -       }
> -
> -       return *host && *pattern && !strcasecmp(host, pattern);
> -}
> +       /*
> +        * If we connected, we require a certificate.
> +        * If we did not connect because of a certificate error, the server
> +        * certificate is not installed in the SSL*, but the verification
> +        * result will still be returned below.
> +        */
> +       if (did_connect) {
> +               X509 *cert = SSL_get_peer_certificate(ssl);
>
> -static int verify_hostname(X509 *cert, const char *hostname)
> -{
> -#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x40000000L)
> -       const X509_NAME *subj;
> -#else
> -       X509_NAME *subj;
> -#endif
> -       const X509_NAME_ENTRY *cname_entry;
> -       const ASN1_STRING *cname;
> -       int i, found;
> -       STACK_OF(GENERAL_NAME) *subj_alt_names;
> -
> -       /* try the DNS subjectAltNames */
> -       found = 0;
> -       if ((subj_alt_names = X509_get_ext_d2i(cert, NID_subject_alt_name, NULL, NULL))) {
> -               int num_subj_alt_names = sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(subj_alt_names);
> -               for (i = 0; !found && i < num_subj_alt_names; i++) {
> -                       int ntype;
> -                       GENERAL_NAME *subj_alt_name = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(subj_alt_names, i);
> -                       ASN1_STRING *subj_alt_str = GENERAL_NAME_get0_value(subj_alt_name, &ntype);
> -
> -                       if (ntype == GEN_DNS && host_matches(hostname, subj_alt_str))
> -                               found = 1;
> -               }
> -               sk_GENERAL_NAME_pop_free(subj_alt_names, GENERAL_NAME_free);
> +               if (!cert)
> +                       return error("unable to get peer certificate.");
> +               X509_free(cert);
>         }
> -       if (found)
> -               return 0;
>
> -       /* try the common name */
> -       if (!(subj = X509_get_subject_name(cert)))
> -               return error("cannot get certificate subject");
> -       if ((i = X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID(subj, NID_commonName, -1)) < 0 ||
> -           (cname_entry = X509_NAME_get_entry(subj, i)) == NULL ||
> -           (cname = X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_data(cname_entry)) == NULL)
> -               return error("cannot get certificate common name");
> -       if (host_matches(hostname, cname))
> -               return 0;
> -       return error("certificate owner '%s' does not match hostname '%s'",
> -                    ASN1_STRING_get0_data(cname), hostname);
> +       /* check the verification result, ignoring the connection success */
> +       verify = SSL_get_verify_result(ssl);
> +       if (verify != X509_V_OK)
> +               return error("unable to verify peer certificate: %s",
> +                            X509_verify_cert_error_string(verify));
> +       return 0;
>  }
>
>  static int ssl_socket_connect(struct imap_socket *sock,
> @@ -293,7 +259,6 @@ static int ssl_socket_connect(struct imap_socket *sock,
>  #endif
>         SSL_CTX *ctx;
>         int ret;
> -       X509 *cert;
>
>         SSL_library_init();
>         SSL_load_error_strings();
> @@ -313,9 +278,6 @@ static int ssl_socket_connect(struct imap_socket *sock,
>         if (use_tls_only)
>                 SSL_CTX_set_options(ctx, SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2 | SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3);
>
> -       if (cfg->ssl_verify)
> -               SSL_CTX_set_verify(ctx, SSL_VERIFY_PEER, NULL);
> -
>         if (!SSL_CTX_set_default_verify_paths(ctx)) {
>                 ssl_socket_perror("SSL_CTX_set_default_verify_paths");
>                 return -1;
> @@ -325,6 +287,16 @@ static int ssl_socket_connect(struct imap_socket *sock,
>                 ssl_socket_perror("SSL_new");
>                 return -1;
>         }
> +       if (cfg->ssl_verify) {
> +               /* follow RFC 9525 section 6.3: no partial wildcards */
> +               SSL_set_hostflags(sock->ssl, X509_CHECK_FLAG_NO_PARTIAL_WILDCARDS);
> +               if (!SSL_set1_host(sock->ssl, cfg->host)) {
> +                       ssl_socket_perror("SSL_set1_host");
> +                       return -1;
> +               }
> +               SSL_set_verify(sock->ssl, SSL_VERIFY_PEER, NULL);
> +       }
> +
>         if (!SSL_set_rfd(sock->ssl, sock->fd[0])) {
>                 ssl_socket_perror("SSL_set_rfd");
>                 return -1;
> @@ -348,20 +320,13 @@ static int ssl_socket_connect(struct imap_socket *sock,
>         ret = SSL_connect(sock->ssl);
>         if (ret <= 0) {
>                 socket_perror("SSL_connect", sock, ret);
> +               if (cfg->ssl_verify)
> +                       verify_peer(sock->ssl, 0);
>                 return -1;
>         }
>
> -       if (cfg->ssl_verify) {
> -               /* make sure the hostname matches that of the certificate */
> -               cert = SSL_get_peer_certificate(sock->ssl);
> -               if (!cert)
> -                       return error("unable to get peer certificate.");
> -               if (SSL_get_verify_result(sock->ssl) != X509_V_OK)
> -                       return error("unable to verify peer certificate");
> -               if (verify_hostname(cert, cfg->host) < 0)
> -                       return -1;
> -       }
> -
> +       if (cfg->ssl_verify)
> +               return verify_peer(sock->ssl, 1);
>         return 0;
>  }
>  #endif
> --
> 2.53.0
>
Previous: Patrick SteinhardtNext: Beat Bolli
Message 16 of 23 in “imap-send: future proofing and two correctness fixes”
  1. 0/3 imap-send: future proofing and two correctness fixesBeat Bolli, Sep 7, 2026
  2. 3/3 imap-send: only check the CN if no SAN DNS names are presentBeat Bolli, Sep 7, 2026
  3. brian m. carlsonSep 8, 2026
  4. 2/3 imap-send: don't expect an ASN1_STRING to be NUL-terminatedBeat Bolli, Sep 7, 2026
  5. Junio C HamanoSep 8, 2026
  6. Patrick SteinhardtSep 8, 2026
  7. 1/3 imap-send: prepare for OpenSSL 4.1Beat Bolli, Sep 7, 2026
  8. Junio C HamanoSep 8, 2026
  9. Patrick SteinhardtSep 8, 2026
  10. Beat BolliSep 14, 2026
  11. Patrick SteinhardtSep 23, 2026
  12. 1/2 imap-send: use the recommended TLS_method()Beat Bolli, Oct 12, 2026
  13. 1/3 imap-send: use the recommended TLS_method()Beat Bolli, Oct 17, 2026
  14. 2/3 imap-send: let OpenSSL do the hostname verificationBeat Bolli, Oct 17, 2026
  15. Patrick SteinhardtOct 19, 2026
  16. Xiangfei DingOct 19, 2026
  17. 3/3 imap-send: prepare for OpenSSL 4.0Beat Bolli, Oct 17, 2026
  18. Patrick SteinhardtOct 19, 2026
  19. Patrick SteinhardtOct 19, 2026
  20. 2/2 imap-send: let OpenSSL do the hostname verificationBeat Bolli, Oct 12, 2026
  21. Aniket GuptaOct 12, 2026
  22. Xiangfei DingOct 16, 2026
  23. Patrick SteinhardtOct 13, 2026

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