Re: [PATCH 2/3] imap-send: don't expect an ASN1_STRING to be NUL-terminated

From: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
Date: Sep 8, 2026, 01:17 UTC
Message-ID: <xmqqwlswzgmq.fsf@gitster.g>
In-Reply-To: <20260907211210.2621693-3-dev+git@drbeat.li>

Beat Bolli <dev+git@drbeat.li> writes:

Show 23 quoted lines

> -	const char *pattern = (const char *)ASN1_STRING_get0_data(asn1_str);
> +	int ret = 0;
> +	size_t len = ASN1_STRING_get_length(asn1_str);
> +	char *pattern = xmemdupz(ASN1_STRING_get0_data(asn1_str), len);
>  
>  	/* embedded NUL characters may open a security hole */
> -	if (memchr(pattern, '\0', ASN1_STRING_get_length(asn1_str)))
> -	    return 0;
> +	if (memchr(pattern, '\0', len))
> +	    goto out;
>  
>  	if (pattern[0] == '*' && pattern[1] == '.') {
>  		pattern += 2;
>  		if (!(host = strchr(host, '.')))
> -			return 0;
> +			goto out;
>  		host++;
>  	}
>  
> -	return *host && *pattern && !strcasecmp(host, pattern);
> +	ret = *host && *pattern && !strcasecmp(host, pattern);
> +out:
> +	free(pattern);

There is a code path that increments the "pattern" variable by 2. Running free() on it would not have a pleasant outcome.

The pattern we often employ in our codebase is to have a separate variable "char *pattern_to_free" and have it used only for a call to free().

> +	return ret;
>  }
>  
>  static int verify_hostname(X509 *cert, const char *hostname)