Re: [PATCH GSoC 2/5] fetch-object-info: parse type from server response
- From
- Chandra Pratap <chandrapratap3519@gmail.com>
- Date
- Jul 29, 2026, 09:57 UTC
- Message-ID
- <CA+J6zkSQYuK-ZJoiQkEJDS9fBypOrBEmgYZRj1yYU00ws2u_HA@mail.gmail.com>
- In-Reply-To
- <20260725-objecttype-support-v1-2-2d4ca3bbabf1@gmail.com>
On Sat, 25 Jul 2026 at 17:25, Pablo Sabater <pabloosabaterr@gmail.com> wrote:
Show 48 quoted lines
>
> The server can handle type requests but does not advertise the
> capability yet. Prepare the client to know how to parse the server
> response once the server advertises the capability.
>
> Mentored-by: Karthik Nayak <karthik.188@gmail.com>
> Mentored-by: Chandra Pratap <chandrapratap3519@gmail.com>
> Signed-off-by: Pablo Sabater <pabloosabaterr@gmail.com>
> ---
> fetch-object-info.c | 12 +++++++++++-
> 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
>
> diff --git a/fetch-object-info.c b/fetch-object-info.c
> index ba7e179c44..cf6b94afb8 100644
> --- a/fetch-object-info.c
> +++ b/fetch-object-info.c
> @@ -50,6 +50,7 @@ int fetch_object_info(const enum protocol_version version, struct object_info_ar
> const int stateless_rpc, const int fd_out)
> {
> int size_index = -1;
> + int type_index = -1;
>
> switch (version) {
> case protocol_v2:
> @@ -101,8 +102,13 @@ int fetch_object_info(const enum protocol_version version, struct object_info_ar
> for (size_t j = 0; j < args->oids->nr; j++)
> object_info_data[j].sizep =
> xcalloc(1, sizeof(*object_info_data[j].sizep));
> + } else if (!strcmp(reader->line, "type")) {
> + type_index = (int)i;
> + for (size_t j = 0; j < args->oids->nr; j++)
> + object_info_data[j].typep =
> + xcalloc(1, sizeof(*object_info_data[j].typep));
> } else {
> - BUG("only size is supported");
> + BUG("unexpected object-info option: %s", reader->line);
> }
> }
>
> @@ -148,6 +154,10 @@ int fetch_object_info(const enum protocol_version version, struct object_info_ar
> object_info_values.items[0].string,
> object_info_values.items[size_index + 1].string);
>
> + if (type_index >= 0)
> + *object_info_data[i].typep =
> + type_from_string(object_info_values.items[type_index + 1].string);
> +
> string_list_clear(&object_info_values, 0);Is there a risk of an out-of-bounds array access here if the server responds with a truncated or malformed packet?
If object_info_values.nr <= type_index + 1, this will segfault.
If there isn't a bounds check slightly higher up in this loop, we should add one. Either way, we should definitely add a test using a mocked server response (e.g., via test-tool pkt-line) to ensure the client gracefully dies with a protocol error rather than segfaulting when it receives a malformed packet.