[PATCH v3 07/12] object API users + docs: check <0, not !0 with check_object_signature()
- From
Ævar Arnfjörð Bjarmason <avarab@gmail.com>
- Date
- Feb 4, 2022, 23:48 UTC
- Message-ID
- <patch-v3-07.12-75abf75a437-20220204T234435Z-avarab@gmail.com>
- In-Reply-To
- <cover-v3-00.12-00000000000-20220204T234435Z-avarab@gmail.com>
Change those users of the object API that misused check_object_signature() by assuming it returned any non-zero when the OID didn't match the expected value to check <0 instead. In practice all of this code worked before, but it wasn't consistent with rest of the users of the API.
Let's also clarify what the <0 return value means in API docs.
Signed-off-by: Ævar Arnfjörð Bjarmason <avarab@gmail.com> --- builtin/index-pack.c | 5 ++--- builtin/mktag.c | 2 +- cache.h | 3 +++ object-file.c | 2 +- pack-check.c | 2 +- 5 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
diff --git a/builtin/index-pack.c b/builtin/index-pack.c index 01574378ce2..416f60a98c1 100644 --- a/builtin/index-pack.c +++ b/builtin/index-pack.c @@ -1412,9 +1412,8 @@ static void fix_unresolved_deltas(struct hashfile *f) if (!data) continue; - if (check_object_signature(the_repository, &d->oid, - data, size, - type_name(type), NULL)) + if (check_object_signature(the_repository, &d->oid, data, size, + type_name(type), NULL) < 0) die(_("local object %s is corrupt"), oid_to_hex(&d->oid)); /* diff --git a/builtin/mktag.c b/builtin/mktag.c index 96a3686af53..98d1e66f327 100644 --- a/builtin/mktag.c +++ b/builtin/mktag.c @@ -97,7 +97,7 @@ int cmd_mktag(int argc, const char **argv, const char *prefix) &tagged_oid, &tagged_type)) die(_("tag on stdin did not pass our strict fsck check")); - if (verify_object_in_tag(&tagged_oid, &tagged_type)) + if (verify_object_in_tag(&tagged_oid, &tagged_type) < 0) die(_("tag on stdin did not refer to a valid object")); if (write_object_file(buf.buf, buf.len, OBJ_TAG, &result) < 0) diff --git a/cache.h b/cache.h index 98d1ef08579..5d081952121 100644 --- a/cache.h +++ b/cache.h @@ -1324,6 +1324,9 @@ int parse_loose_header(const char *hdr, struct object_info *oi); * object name actually matches "oid" to detect object corruption. * With "buf" == NULL, try reading the object named with "oid" using * the streaming interface and rehash it to do the same. + * + * A negative value indicates an error, usually that the OID is not + * what we expected, but it might also indicate another error. */ int check_object_signature(struct repository *r, const struct object_id *oid, void *buf, unsigned long size, const char *type, diff --git a/object-file.c b/object-file.c index 44e0b32d71a..d628f58c0d2 100644 --- a/object-file.c +++ b/object-file.c @@ -2613,7 +2613,7 @@ int read_loose_object(const char *path, } if (check_object_signature(the_repository, expected_oid, *contents, *size, - oi->type_name->buf, real_oid)) + oi->type_name->buf, real_oid) < 0) goto out; } diff --git a/pack-check.c b/pack-check.c index 3f418e3a6af..48d818ee7b4 100644 --- a/pack-check.c +++ b/pack-check.c @@ -143,7 +143,7 @@ static int verify_packfile(struct repository *r, oid_to_hex(&oid), p->pack_name, (uintmax_t)entries[i].offset); else if (check_object_signature(r, &oid, data, size, - type_name(type), NULL)) + type_name(type), NULL) < 0) err = error("packed %s from %s is corrupt", oid_to_hex(&oid), p->pack_name); else if (fn) {
-- 2.35.1.940.ge7a5b4b05f2