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Re: Bare repositories in the working tree are a security risk

From
Glen Choo <chooglen@google.com>
Date
Apr 16, 2022, 00:41 UTC
Message-ID
<kl6lwnfp7tbc.fsf@chooglen-macbookpro.roam.corp.google.com>
In-Reply-To
<kl6lsfqpygsj.fsf@chooglen-macbookpro.roam.corp.google.com>

(resending this because I think the original got blocked, and I messed up the CC list anyway.)

Hi all! Thanks for chiming in.

I'm sorry I wasn't able to participate in a timely manner, and unfortunately (once again..), I will be out of the office (returning 27 Apr, PDT) and my colleagues will be keeping tabs on the discussion in my stead (once again..).

Nevertheless, I think the conversation has been pretty fruitful, so I'm optimistic about next steps. Here's my understanding of the conversation thus far - do chime in if you feel I'm off base or if I've missed something:

* We all agree that something needs to be done about embedded bare repos. This
  is a pretty good starting point IMO, because we agree that 'do nothing' isn't
  a good response.
* There are use cases for embedded bare repos that don't have great alternatives
  (e.g. libgit2 uses bare repos in its tests). Even if this workflow is frowned
  upon (I personally don't think we should support it), I don't think we're
  ready to categorically declare that Git should ban embedded bare repos
  altogether (e.g. the way we ban .GiT).
* We want additional protection on the client besides `git fsck`; there are 
  a few ways to do this:
  1. Prevent checking out an embedded bare repo.
  2. Detect if the bare repo is embedded and refuse to work with it.
  3. Detect if the bare repo is embedded and do not read its config/hooks, but
     everything else still 'works'.
  4. Don't detect bare repos.
  5. Only detect bare repos that are named `.git` [1].
  (I've responded with my thoughts on each of these approaches in-thread).
With that in mind, here's what I propose we do next:
* Merge the `git fsck` patch [2] if we think that it is useful despite the
  potentially huge number of false positives. That patch needs some fixing; I'll
  make the changes when I'm back.
* I'll experiment with (5), and if it seems promising, I'll propose this as an
  opt-in feature, with the intent of making it opt-out in the future. We'll
  opt-into this at Google to help figure out if this is a good default or not.
* If that direction turns out not to be promising, I'll pursue (1), since that
  is the only option that can be configured per-repo, which should hopefully
  minimize the fallout.

Given that this embedded bare repo problem has been known for a long time, I don't think we need to rush out a fix, but (especially since I'll be OOO) I'm more than happy for someone to take my ideas (or any ideas) and run with them.

[1] https://lore.kernel.org/git/kl6l5yn99ahv.fsf@chooglen-macbookpro.roam.corp.google.com/ [2] https://lore.kernel.org/git/20220406232231.47714-1-chooglen@google.com

Previous: Taylor BlauNext: Taylor Blau
Message 36 of 50 in “Bare repositories in the working tree are a security risk”
  1. Glen ChooApr 6, 2022
  2. fsck: detect bare repos in trees and warnGlen Choo, Apr 6, 2022
  3. Johannes SchindelinApr 7, 2022
  4. Derrick StoleeApr 7, 2022
  5. Ævar Arnfjörð BjarmasonApr 7, 2022
  6. Glen ChooApr 14, 2022
  7. Ævar Arnfjörð BjarmasonApr 15, 2022
  8. Junio C HamanoApr 7, 2022
  9. Glen ChooApr 13, 2022
  10. Ævar Arnfjörð BjarmasonApr 7, 2022
  11. Junio C HamanoApr 7, 2022
  12. John CaiApr 7, 2022
  13. brian m. carlsonApr 7, 2022
  14. Justin StevenApr 7, 2022
  15. brian m. carlsonApr 7, 2022
  16. rsbecker@nexbridge.comApr 7, 2022
  17. Junio C HamanoApr 8, 2022
  18. Junio C HamanoApr 14, 2022
  19. Glen ChooApr 14, 2022
  20. Glen ChooApr 13, 2022
  21. Glen ChooApr 13, 2022
  22. Junio C HamanoApr 13, 2022
  23. Glen ChooApr 14, 2022
  24. Junio C HamanoApr 14, 2022
  25. Junio C HamanoApr 14, 2022
  26. Glen ChooApr 15, 2022
  27. Junio C HamanoApr 15, 2022
  28. Taylor BlauApr 16, 2022
  29. Glen ChooApr 15, 2022
  30. Junio C HamanoApr 15, 2022
  31. Glen ChooApr 15, 2022
  32. Glen ChooApr 15, 2022
  33. Taylor BlauApr 16, 2022
  34. Junio C HamanoApr 16, 2022
  35. Taylor BlauApr 16, 2022
  36. Glen ChooApr 16, 2022
  37. Taylor BlauApr 16, 2022
  38. Emily ShafferApr 21, 2022
  39. Emily ShafferApr 21, 2022
  40. Junio C HamanoApr 21, 2022
  41. Taylor BlauApr 21, 2022
  42. Taylor BlauApr 21, 2022
  43. Emily ShafferApr 21, 2022
  44. Taylor BlauApr 21, 2022
  45. Glen ChooApr 29, 2022
  46. Taylor BlauApr 30, 2022
  47. Glen ChooMay 2, 2022
  48. Philip OakleyMay 2, 2022
  49. Junio C HamanoMay 2, 2022
  50. Glen ChooApr 16, 2022

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