git/list[1] front-page[2] threads[3] people[4] search[5] about
 

RE: Bare repositories in the working tree are a security risk

From
rsbecker@nexbridge.com <rsbecker@nexbridge.com>
Date
Apr 7, 2022, 22:40 UTC
Message-ID
<005d01d84ad0$782e8fc0$688baf40$@nexbridge.com>
In-Reply-To
<Yk9hONuCIVIq6ieV@camp.crustytoothpaste.net>
On April 7, 2022 6:10 PM, brian m. carlson wrote:
Show 36 quoted lines
>On 2022-04-07 at 21:53:26, Justin Steven wrote:
>> Hi all,
>>
>> I'm the author of one of the articles linked in Glen's mail. Thank you
>> Glen for summarising the problem beautifully and pushing this forward.
>>
>> Brian said:
>> > As mentioned elsewhere, git status doesn't work without a working tree.
>>
>> This is correct. However, it is possible to embed a bare repo that has
>> its own core.worktree which points to a directory within the
>> containing repo, satisfying the requirement of having a working tree.
>> This is covered in the article [1] and looks to be accounted for in
>> Taylor's reproducer script which admittedly I haven't run.
>>
>> > Instead, I'd rather see us avoid executing any program from the
>> > config or any hooks in a bare repository without a working tree
>> > (except for pushes).  I think that would avoid breaking things while
>> > still improving security.
>>
>> Due to the fact that the embedded bare repo can be made to have a
>> working tree, this won't be an effective fix.
>
>Then we'd probably be better off just walking up the entire hierarchy and
>excluding worktrees from embedded bare repositories, or otherwise restricting
>the config we read.  That will probably mean we'll need to walk the entire
>directory hierarchy to see if it's embedded (or at least to the root of the device) in
>such a case, but that should be relatively uncommon.
>
>I'd definitely like to see us make a security improvement here, but I also would like
>to avoid us breaking a lot of repositories, especially since we lack alternatives.
>
>If git fast-import could 100% correctly round-trip all commits and repositories, I
>would be much more open to blocking this in fsck after a deprecation period, but
>as it stands that's not possible.  Perhaps improving that would be a suitable way
>forward.
One option relating to enable/disable this is to set up a config option that, by default is false, to allow embedded bare repositories. At least with enough warning that this option is required, it might be acceptable. I would prefer never to receive a bare repo through any means (including through a more worrying submodule). From an attack vector standpoint, I would be more concerned about this in an automation setting, say GitHub workflows or Jenkins GitSCM. At least with GitHub workflows, this is "somewhat" contained within VMs under GitHub's control - although not entirely. Jenkins is probably more vulnerable as the clones done through that path do not get the same scrutiny, although in my world, I use a dedicated non-root UID and sandbox the whole thing. This topic makes me nervous and wonder whether we should be self-reporting a CVE.

Shuddering, Randall

Previous: brian m. carlsonNext: Junio C Hamano
Message 16 of 50 in “Bare repositories in the working tree are a security risk”
  1. Glen ChooApr 6, 2022
  2. fsck: detect bare repos in trees and warnGlen Choo, Apr 6, 2022
  3. Johannes SchindelinApr 7, 2022
  4. Derrick StoleeApr 7, 2022
  5. Ævar Arnfjörð BjarmasonApr 7, 2022
  6. Glen ChooApr 14, 2022
  7. Ævar Arnfjörð BjarmasonApr 15, 2022
  8. Junio C HamanoApr 7, 2022
  9. Glen ChooApr 13, 2022
  10. Ævar Arnfjörð BjarmasonApr 7, 2022
  11. Junio C HamanoApr 7, 2022
  12. John CaiApr 7, 2022
  13. brian m. carlsonApr 7, 2022
  14. Justin StevenApr 7, 2022
  15. brian m. carlsonApr 7, 2022
  16. rsbecker@nexbridge.comApr 7, 2022
  17. Junio C HamanoApr 8, 2022
  18. Junio C HamanoApr 14, 2022
  19. Glen ChooApr 14, 2022
  20. Glen ChooApr 13, 2022
  21. Glen ChooApr 13, 2022
  22. Junio C HamanoApr 13, 2022
  23. Glen ChooApr 14, 2022
  24. Junio C HamanoApr 14, 2022
  25. Junio C HamanoApr 14, 2022
  26. Glen ChooApr 15, 2022
  27. Junio C HamanoApr 15, 2022
  28. Taylor BlauApr 16, 2022
  29. Glen ChooApr 15, 2022
  30. Junio C HamanoApr 15, 2022
  31. Glen ChooApr 15, 2022
  32. Glen ChooApr 15, 2022
  33. Taylor BlauApr 16, 2022
  34. Junio C HamanoApr 16, 2022
  35. Taylor BlauApr 16, 2022
  36. Glen ChooApr 16, 2022
  37. Taylor BlauApr 16, 2022
  38. Emily ShafferApr 21, 2022
  39. Emily ShafferApr 21, 2022
  40. Junio C HamanoApr 21, 2022
  41. Taylor BlauApr 21, 2022
  42. Taylor BlauApr 21, 2022
  43. Emily ShafferApr 21, 2022
  44. Taylor BlauApr 21, 2022
  45. Glen ChooApr 29, 2022
  46. Taylor BlauApr 30, 2022
  47. Glen ChooMay 2, 2022
  48. Philip OakleyMay 2, 2022
  49. Junio C HamanoMay 2, 2022
  50. Glen ChooApr 16, 2022

Read the whole thread, see it on lore, or plain text.

$ cat FOOTERMessages come from the public archive at lore.kernel.org/git, fetched every hour. The front page is chosen and written each morning by an AI editor and can be wrong; the threads themselves are the record. About and API. For agents: an MCP server at https://gitlist.dev/mcp, and any thread, story or person page as Markdown by adding .md to its URL (or sending Accept: text/markdown). Details in /llms.txt.