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Re: [PATCH 02/10] builtin/fast-import: fix segfault with unsafe SHA1

From
Patrick Steinhardt <ps@pks.im>
Date
Jan 7, 2025, 12:06 UTC
Message-ID
<Z30YvHKjA_b6_xwt@pks.im>
In-Reply-To
<Z3wsZjAqbfI/EdVe@nand.local>
On Mon, Jan 06, 2025 at 02:17:58PM -0500, Taylor Blau wrote:
Show 54 quoted lines
> On Fri, Jan 03, 2025 at 02:08:01PM +0100, Patrick Steinhardt wrote:
> > On Mon, Dec 30, 2024 at 12:22:34PM -0500, Taylor Blau wrote:
> > > On Mon, Dec 30, 2024 at 03:24:02PM +0100, Patrick Steinhardt wrote:
> > > > diff --git a/builtin/fast-import.c b/builtin/fast-import.c
> > > > index 1fa2929a01b7dfee52b653248bba802884f6be6a..0f86392761abbe6acb217fef7f4fe7c3ff5ac1fa 100644
> > > > --- a/builtin/fast-import.c
> > > > +++ b/builtin/fast-import.c
> > > > @@ -1106,7 +1106,7 @@ static void stream_blob(uintmax_t len, struct object_id *oidout, uintmax_t mark)
> > > >  		|| (pack_size + PACK_SIZE_THRESHOLD + len) < pack_size)
> > > >  		cycle_packfile();
> > > >
> > > > -	the_hash_algo->init_fn(&checkpoint.ctx);
> > > > +	the_hash_algo->unsafe_init_fn(&checkpoint.ctx);
> > >
> > > This will obviously fix the issue at hand, but I don't think this is any
> > > less brittle than before. The hash function implementation here needs to
> > > agree with that used in the hashfile API. This change makes that
> > > happen, but only using side information that the hashfile API uses the
> > > unsafe variants.
> >
> > Yup, I only cared about fixing the segfault because we're close to the
> > v2.48 release. I agree that the overall state is still extremely brittle
> > right now.
> >
> > [snip]
> > > I think we should perhaps combine forces here. My ideal end-state is to
> > > have the unsafe_hash_algo() stuff land from my earlier series, then have
> > > these two fixes (adjusted to the new world order as above), and finally
> > > the Meson fixes after that.
> > >
> > > Does that seem like a plan to you? If so, I can put everything together
> > > and send it out (if you're OK with me forging your s-o-b).
> >
> > I think the ideal state would be if the hashing function used was stored
> > as part of `struct git_hash_ctx`. So the flow basically becomes for
> > example:
> >
> >     ```
> >     struct git_hash_ctx ctx;
> >     struct object_id oid;
> >
> >     git_hash_sha1_init(&ctx);
> >     git_hash_update(&ctx, data);
> >     git_hash_final_oid(&oid, &ctx);
> >     ```
> >
> > Note how the intermediate calls don't need to know which hash function
> > you used to initialize the `struct git_hash_ctx` -- the structure itself
> > should remember what it has been initilized with and do the right thing.
> 
> I'm not sure I'm following you here. In the stream_blob() function
> within fast-import, the problem isn't that we're switching hash
> functions mid-stream, but that we're initializing the hashfile_context
> structure with the wrong hash function to begin with.

True, but it would have been a non-issue if the hash context itself knew which hash function to use for updates. Sure, we would've used the slow variant of SHA1 instead of the fast-but-unsafe one. But that feels like the lesser evil compared to crashing.

Show 10 quoted lines
> You snipped it out of your reply, but I think that my suggestion to do:
> 
>     pack_file->algop->init_fn(&checkpoint.ctx);
> 
> would harden us against the broken behavior we're seeing here.
> 
> As a separate defense-in-depth measure, we could teach functions from
> the hashfile API which deal with hashfile_checkpoint structure to ensure
> that the hashfile and its checkpoint both use the same algorithm (by
> adding a hash_algo field to the hashfile_checkpoint structure).

I would think that it were even harder to abuse if it wasn't the hashfile API, but the hash API that remembered the algorithm.

Patrick
Previous: Taylor BlauNext: Taylor Blau
Message 7 of 19 in “Fix segfaults when using the unsafe SHA1 backend”
  1. 00/10 Fix segfaults when using the unsafe SHA1 backendPatrick Steinhardt, Dec 30, 2024
  2. 02/10 builtin/fast-import: fix segfault with unsafe SHA1 backendPatrick Steinhardt, Dec 30, 2024
  3. Taylor BlauDec 30, 2024
  4. Patrick SteinhardtJan 3, 2025
  5. Junio C HamanoJan 3, 2025
  6. Taylor BlauJan 6, 2025
  7. Patrick SteinhardtJan 7, 2025
  8. Taylor BlauJan 8, 2025
  9. Patrick SteinhardtJan 9, 2025
  10. 01/10 bulk-checkin: fix segfault with unsafe SHA1 backendPatrick Steinhardt, Dec 30, 2024
  11. 03/10 ci: exercise unsafe OpenSSL backendPatrick Steinhardt, Dec 30, 2024
  12. Taylor BlauDec 30, 2024
  13. 04/10 meson: consistenlty spell 'CommonCrypto'Patrick Steinhardt, Dec 30, 2024
  14. 05/10 meson: deduplicate access to SHA1/SHA256 backend optionsPatrick Steinhardt, Dec 30, 2024
  15. 06/10 meson: require SecurityFramework when it's used as SHA1 backendPatrick Steinhardt, Dec 30, 2024
  16. 07/10 meson: simplify conditions for HTTPS and SHA1 dependenciesPatrick Steinhardt, Dec 30, 2024
  17. 08/10 meson: add missing dots for build optionsPatrick Steinhardt, Dec 30, 2024
  18. 09/10 meson: wire up unsafe SHA1 backendPatrick Steinhardt, Dec 30, 2024
  19. 10/10 meson: provide a summary of configured backendsPatrick Steinhardt, Dec 30, 2024

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