Re: [PATCH 4/4] resolve_ref_unsafe(): close race condition reading loose refs

From: Thomas Rast <trast@inf.ethz.ch>
Date: Jun 13, 2013, 08:22 UTC
Message-ID: <87d2rqs9ma.fsf@linux-k42r.v.cablecom.net>
In-Reply-To: <1370960780-1055-5-git-send-email-mhagger@alum.mit.edu>

Michael Haggerty <mhagger@alum.mit.edu> writes:

Show 11 quoted lines

> One race is still possible and undetected: another process could
> change the file from a regular file into a symlink between the call to
> lstat and the call to open().  The open() call would silently follow
> the symlink and not know that something is wrong.  I don't see a way
> to detect this situation without the use of the O_NOFOLLOW option,
> which is not portable and is not used elsewhere in our code base.
>
> However, we don't use symlinks anymore, so this situation is unlikely.
> And it doesn't appear that treating a symlink as a regular file would
> have grave consequences; after all, this is exactly how the code
> handles non-relative symlinks.

You could fstat() the fd you got from open(), and verify that it is still the same inode/device. That's wasting one syscall per ref for pretty much everyone, but perhaps if we really cared about this (and I gather from the above that we don't), we could conditionally use O_NOFOLLOW if available, otherwise do that fstat().

-- 
Thomas Rast
trast@{inf,student}.ethz.ch