Re: [PATCH 2/4] receive-pack: implement advertising and receiving push options

From: Stefan Beller <sbeller@google.com>
Date: Jul 8, 2016, 22:17 UTC
Message-ID: <CAGZ79kZOdcJwd0ePMquhfJTv=xZGP_+w4BRV=GyTy3ejb79yrQ@mail.gmail.com>
In-Reply-To: <20160708214637.GB9820@sigill.intra.peff.net>

On Fri, Jul 8, 2016 at 2:46 PM, Jeff King <peff@peff.net> wrote:

Show 18 quoted lines

> On Fri, Jul 08, 2016 at 11:57:20AM -0700, Stefan Beller wrote:
>
>> >> Sorry to butt into the conversation late, but: I am not yet convinced.
>> >>
>> >> Is the idea that if the push options were very large, this would save
>> >> the client from the cost of sending them?
>> >
>> > Not really.  I have no strong opinion on the benefit of limiting
>> > number/size.  Stefan limited the number/size at the receiving end
>> > and made receiving end die with its message.
>>
>> Jeff claimed we'd need some sort of DoS protection for this feature,
>> so I considered just die-ing enough for an initial implementation.
>
> I do not think we need to worry too much about niceties for these
> limits. The point is to protect servers from malicious nonsense, like
> somebody sending gigabytes of push options, or trying to overflow a
> buffer in a hook with a large value.

Agreed. This would speak for keeping the implementation as is.

Show 6 quoted lines

>If people are seeing these in
> routine use, then the limits are set too low, and this should happen
> roughly as often as a BUG assertion, and IMHO should be treated roughly
> the same: don't bother with translation, and don't worry about
> optimizing wasted bandwidth for this case. It won't happen enough to
> matter.

Well the wasted band width is part of the server protection, no? This would favor the idea Jonathan came up with:

    server: I advertise push options
    client: ok I want to use push options
    client: I'll send you 1000 push options with upper bound of 1000M
    server: It's a bit too much, eh?
    * server quits

So this case only occurs for the (malicious?) corner case, where I do not bother a translation.

But having the size announcement not in the capability advertisement, but in the actual push options phase makes sense to me as we do not want to clutter the capabilities with data that can come later. We would only waste a little bit of band width, (the initial ls-remote and command list of the client).

Speaking of this, I can craft a malicious client that sends the following command list

0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 refs/heads/loooooooooooooooooong-ref 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 refs/heads/loooooooooooooooooong-ref 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 refs/heads/loooooooooooooooooong-ref 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 refs/heads/loooooooooooooooooong-ref 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 refs/heads/loooooooooooooooooong-ref <repeat the above a few times> 0000

IIUC in the receive-pack code we would queue that up and the error checking (two times null sha1? update of the same ref more than once?), is done just after we send out the flush packet, i.e. when all commands are received.

This would also result in sending gigabytes of junk as well as a memory issue on the server side?

The new push options design is actually neat in the way that the client exactly says what it wants and the server can reject early, but not cluttering the capability advertisement.

Thanks, Stefan