Re: [RCF] Secure git against involuntary arb. code execution without feature loss
- From
Michael Lohmann <git@lohmann.sh>
- Date
- Oct 8, 2025, 22:09 UTC
- Message-ID
- <25FB37DC-09F3-41F4-ACFE-6F8A854E50B8@lohmann.sh>
- In-Reply-To
- <aObceC/Ec/TGTEnv@nand.local>
Show 19 quoted lines
> On 8. Oct 2025, at 23:49, Taylor Blau <me@ttaylorr.com> wrote: > > On Wed, Oct 08, 2025 at 05:30:08PM -0400, Taylor Blau wrote: >> On Wed, Oct 08, 2025 at 11:02:03PM +0200, Michael Lohmann wrote: >>> * Proposed solution (keeping all existing features): >>> - On first use, git generates a secret "token" (e.g. a random string in >>> ~/.gitsecret) >>> - On calling `git init` or `git clone`, the secret is copied into the >>> new .git directory and serves as proof that this clone was created by >>> this user >> >> Sure, but the problem is not with direct clones (at least, not using the >> --local optimization), but with clones that recursively clone other >> submodules. > > This is a think-o. I meant to ask whether or not we would respect the > token from the top-most $GIT_DIR in nested bare repositories. I imagine > we would not (otherwise this proposal would not provide any additional > security guarantees), and so...
My understanding was that submodules would add their own git folder in the top-level .git/modules/my-submodule, so obviously in order to trust a submodule, you need to "sign" these too and you could automatically also with --recursive.
(Sorry @Taylor - I missed adding the whole list as recipient, so you get this twice...)