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RE: [RCF] Secure git against involuntary arb. code execution without feature loss

From
rsbecker@nexbridge.com <rsbecker@nexbridge.com>
Date
Oct 8, 2025, 21:34 UTC
Message-ID
<020201dc389b$677305f0$365911d0$@nexbridge.com>
In-Reply-To
<aObX4C7lMHRnjbYq@nand.local>
On October 8, 2025 5:30 PM, Taylor Blau wrote:
Show 24 quoted lines
>On Wed, Oct 08, 2025 at 11:02:03PM +0200, Michael Lohmann wrote:
>> * Proposed solution (keeping all existing features):
>> - On first use, git generates a secret "token" (e.g. a random string in
>>   ~/.gitsecret)
>> - On calling `git init` or `git clone`, the secret is copied into the
>>   new .git directory and serves as proof that this clone was created by
>>   this user
>
>Sure, but the problem is not with direct clones (at least, not using the --local
>optimization), but with clones that recursively clone other submodules.
>
>If I clone a repository with --recurse-submodules, I imagine that this proposal
>would *not* suggest copying this token into the recursively cloned submodules,
>right?
>proposal improves the experience
>
>> - Editors would no longer need to prompt the user for "Do you trust this
>>   repository?" in most cases, because git could prove the clone is user
>>   generated.
>
>If the above is true (that Git would not copy the token into recursively cloned
>submodules), then I admit to struggling a bit to see how this proposal would
>remove the need to consult the user in this case. Instead of the editor doing it, the
>user would need to do it themselves?

I am wondering why this approach cannot be made more general. If there is a tokenization framework built into git that organizations can use for integration, they should be able to plug-in their own approved tokenization solutions, which have already been vetted by the security groups. I am concerned that we are potentially opening up git to CVEs due to insufficiently secure tokens that are outside our specific domain.

--Randall
Previous: Taylor BlauNext: Taylor Blau
Message 3 of 10 in “[RCF] Secure git against involuntary arb. code execution without feature loss”
  1. Michael LohmannOct 8, 2025
  2. Taylor BlauOct 8, 2025
  3. rsbecker@nexbridge.comOct 8, 2025
  4. Taylor BlauOct 8, 2025
  5. Michael LohmannOct 8, 2025
  6. brian m. carlsonOct 8, 2025
  7. Michael LohmannOct 8, 2025
  8. Jeff KingOct 9, 2025
  9. Michael LohmannOct 9, 2025
  10. Submitted patches for "assume unsafe"Michael Lohmann, Oct 13, 2025

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