RE: [RCF] Secure git against involuntary arb. code execution without feature loss
- From
rsbecker@nexbridge.com <rsbecker@nexbridge.com>
- Date
- Oct 8, 2025, 21:34 UTC
- Message-ID
- <020201dc389b$677305f0$365911d0$@nexbridge.com>
- In-Reply-To
- <aObX4C7lMHRnjbYq@nand.local>
On October 8, 2025 5:30 PM, Taylor Blau wrote:
Show 24 quoted lines
>On Wed, Oct 08, 2025 at 11:02:03PM +0200, Michael Lohmann wrote: >> * Proposed solution (keeping all existing features): >> - On first use, git generates a secret "token" (e.g. a random string in >> ~/.gitsecret) >> - On calling `git init` or `git clone`, the secret is copied into the >> new .git directory and serves as proof that this clone was created by >> this user > >Sure, but the problem is not with direct clones (at least, not using the --local >optimization), but with clones that recursively clone other submodules. > >If I clone a repository with --recurse-submodules, I imagine that this proposal >would *not* suggest copying this token into the recursively cloned submodules, >right? >proposal improves the experience > >> - Editors would no longer need to prompt the user for "Do you trust this >> repository?" in most cases, because git could prove the clone is user >> generated. > >If the above is true (that Git would not copy the token into recursively cloned >submodules), then I admit to struggling a bit to see how this proposal would >remove the need to consult the user in this case. Instead of the editor doing it, the >user would need to do it themselves?
I am wondering why this approach cannot be made more general. If there is a tokenization framework built into git that organizations can use for integration, they should be able to plug-in their own approved tokenization solutions, which have already been vetted by the security groups. I am concerned that we are potentially opening up git to CVEs due to insufficiently secure tokens that are outside our specific domain.
--Randall