Re: [PATCH v3 2/3] safe.directory: normalize the configured path
- From
Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
- Date
- Jul 30, 2024, 07:31 UTC
- Message-ID
- <20240730073119.GA562212@coredump.intra.peff.net>
- In-Reply-To
- <20240730011004.4030246-3-gitster@pobox.com>
On Mon, Jul 29, 2024 at 06:10:03PM -0700, Junio C Hamano wrote:
Show 9 quoted lines
> Two and a half things to note, compared to the previous step to > normalize the actual path of the suspected repository, are: > > - A configured safe.directory may be coming from .gitignore in the > home directory that may be shared across machines. The path > meant to match with an entry may not necessarily exist on all of > such machines, so not being able to convert them to real path on > this machine is *not* a condition that is worthy of warning. > Hence, we ignore a path that cannot be converted to a real path.
Thanks, I think this addresses my concern. One small thing I noticed in the patch:
Show 22 quoted lines
> @@ -1236,14 +1236,43 @@ static int safe_directory_cb(const char *key, const char *value,
>
> if (!git_config_pathname(&allowed, key, value)) {
> const char *check = allowed ? allowed : value;
> - if (ends_with(check, "/*")) {
> - size_t len = strlen(check);
> - if (!fspathncmp(check, data->path, len - 1))
> + char *to_free = NULL;
> +
> + /*
> + * Setting safe.directory to a non-absolute path
> + * makes little sense---it won't be relative to
> + * the configuration file the item is defined in.
> + * Except for ".", which means "if we are at the top
> + * level of a repository, then it is OK", which is
> + * slightly tighter than "*" that allows discovery.
> + */
> + if (!is_absolute_path(check) && strcmp(check, ".")) {
> + warning(_("safe.directory '%s' not absolute"),
> + check);
> + goto next;
> + }This is_absolute_path() check is redundant, isn't it? If we are checking for a literal ".", then we know the patch must be non-absolute.
-Peff