Christian Noé Ramos López, testing git 2.47.3 and reading master (c46c1e37724f), describes two issues that together mean an SSH signing key cannot be reliably stopped from being trusted.
First, SSH signatures carry no time of their own, so git passes -Overify-time from the committer or tagger line. A key with valid-before="20260101" still verified as good for a commit backdated to 2025-06-01, while an honestly dated one did not. Whoever creates the commit or tag can set that date to any value.
Second, when gpg.ssh.revocationFile names a file that does not exist, Git warns and runs ssh-keygen without it, so a signature from a revoked key verifies as good. An unreadable file already makes ssh-keygen refuse, and he notes sshd also refuses all public key authentication when its RevokedKeys file is unreadable.
His patches turn the missing-file warning into a verification failure with an error message. Users who want verification to continue without the file can prefix the path with ":(optional)", which makes Git treat the variable as unset if the file is absent. A documentation patch corrects the description of gpg.ssh.allowedSignersFile. It currently says a signature is valid if the key was valid when the signature was created. The patch says which date is used and that it is not evidence of when the signature was made. It adds that the same holds for the creation time in a GPG signature.
Phillip Wood and Patrick Steinhardt took part in the thread, but their positions are not in the excerpts. Whether the missing-file behavior change is accepted is unresolved.