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Re: [PATCH 2/2] reftable/stack: accept insecure random bytes

From
Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
Date
Jan 7, 2025, 20:56 UTC
Message-ID
<xmqqzfk2qr62.fsf@gitster.g>
In-Reply-To
<20250107-b4-pks-reftable-csprng-v1-2-6109a54a8756@pks.im>
Patrick Steinhardt <ps@pks.im> writes:
> The report was for NonStop, which uses OpenSSL as the backend for
> randomness. In the preceding commit we have adapted that backend to also
> return randomness in case the entropy pool is empty and the caller
> passes the `CSPRNG_BYTES_INSECURE` flag. Do so to fix the issue.
No kidding.

This is calling rand(3). The use of the resulting value is to fuzz the delay before retrying, which wants NO CRYPTOGRAPHIC randomness. This callsite does not require it, but rand(3) is perfect for ensuring predictability/repeatability as well (via srand(3)).

And it is not allowed to fail.

Yet a platform replaces it with a function that returns an error or aborts? What kind of nonsense is that? Do we really need to cater to such an insanity?

Use of git_rand() here goes backwards against the more recent trend in reftable/ directory to wean the code off of the rest of Git by getting rid of unnecessary dependency, doesn't it?

I think [PATCH 1/2] makes sense regardless, though. But shouldn't we be pushing back this step, with "fix your rand(3)"?

Thanks.
Show 28 quoted lines
> Reported-by: Randall S. Becker <rsbecker@nexbridge.com>
> Signed-off-by: Patrick Steinhardt <ps@pks.im>
> ---
>  reftable/stack.c | 4 ++--
>  1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/reftable/stack.c b/reftable/stack.c
> index 6d0aa774e7e29d5366ed55df19725944f8eef792..572a74e00f9ed6040534e060652e72c26641749d 100644
> --- a/reftable/stack.c
> +++ b/reftable/stack.c
> @@ -493,7 +493,7 @@ static int reftable_stack_reload_maybe_reuse(struct reftable_stack *st,
>  		close(fd);
>  		fd = -1;
>  
> -		delay = delay + (delay * rand()) / RAND_MAX + 1;
> +		delay = delay + (delay * git_rand(CSPRNG_BYTES_INSECURE)) / UINT32_MAX + 1;
>  		sleep_millisec(delay);
>  	}
>  
> @@ -659,7 +659,7 @@ int reftable_stack_add(struct reftable_stack *st,
>  static int format_name(struct reftable_buf *dest, uint64_t min, uint64_t max)
>  {
>  	char buf[100];
> -	uint32_t rnd = (uint32_t)git_rand(0);
> +	uint32_t rnd = git_rand(CSPRNG_BYTES_INSECURE);
>  	snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "0x%012" PRIx64 "-0x%012" PRIx64 "-%08x",
>  		 min, max, rnd);
>  	reftable_buf_reset(dest);
Previous: rsbecker@nexbridge.comNext: rsbecker@nexbridge.com
Message 5 of 19 in “reftable/stack: stop dying on exhausted entropy pool”
  1. 0/2 reftable/stack: stop dying on exhausted entropy poolPatrick Steinhardt, Jan 7, 2025
  2. 1/2 wrapper: allow generating insecure random bytesPatrick Steinhardt, Jan 7, 2025
  3. 2/2 reftable/stack: accept insecure random bytesPatrick Steinhardt, Jan 7, 2025
  4. rsbecker@nexbridge.comJan 7, 2025
  5. Junio C HamanoJan 7, 2025
  6. rsbecker@nexbridge.comJan 7, 2025
  7. Junio C HamanoJan 7, 2025
  8. Junio C HamanoJan 7, 2025
  9. Patrick SteinhardtJan 8, 2025
  10. Junio C HamanoJan 8, 2025
  11. Patrick SteinhardtJan 8, 2025
  12. Junio C HamanoJan 8, 2025
  13. Patrick SteinhardtJan 8, 2025
  14. rsbecker@nexbridge.comJan 7, 2025
  15. brian m. carlsonJan 7, 2025
  16. rsbecker@nexbridge.comJan 7, 2025
  17. Patrick SteinhardtJan 8, 2025
  18. rsbecker@nexbridge.comJan 8, 2025
  19. brian m. carlsonJan 8, 2025

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