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Re: [PATCH] howto: document more tools for recovery corruption

From
Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
Date
Apr 1, 2015, 22:21 UTC
Message-ID
<xmqq4mozmqw3.fsf@gitster.dls.corp.google.com>
In-Reply-To
<20150401210856.GA23050@peff.net>
Jeff King <peff@peff.net> writes:
Show 5 quoted lines
> Long ago, I documented a corruption recovery I did and gave
> some C code that I used to help find a flipped bit.  I had
> to fix a similar case recently, and I ended up writing a few
> more tools.  I hope nobody ever has to use these, but it
> does not hurt to share them, just in case.

I am having a hard time deciding if I should take the Date: header of the patch e-mail into consideration. The munge thing looks serious enough, though.

Show 251 quoted lines
> Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
> ---
>  .../howto/recover-corrupted-object-harder.txt      | 237 +++++++++++++++++++++
>  1 file changed, 237 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/Documentation/howto/recover-corrupted-object-harder.txt
> b/Documentation/howto/recover-corrupted-object-harder.txt
> index 23e685d..9c4cd09 100644
> --- a/Documentation/howto/recover-corrupted-object-harder.txt
> +++ b/Documentation/howto/recover-corrupted-object-harder.txt
> @@ -240,3 +240,240 @@ But more importantly, git's hashing and checksumming noticed a problem
>  that easily could have gone undetected in another system. The result
>  still compiled, but would have caused an interesting bug (that would
>  have been blamed on some random commit).
> +
> +
> +The adventure continues...
> +--------------------------
> +
> +I ended up doing this again! Same entity, new hardware. The assumption
> +at this point is that the old disk corrupted the packfile, and then the
> +corruption was migrated to the new hardware (because it was done by
> +rsync or similar, and no fsck was done at the time of migration).
> +
> +This time, the affected blob was over 20 megabytes, which was far too
> +large to do a brute-force on. I followed the instructions above to
> +create the `zlib` file. I then used the `inflate` program below to pull
> +the corrupted data from that. Examining that output gave me a hint about
> +where in the file the corruption was. But now I was working with the
> +file itself, not the zlib contents. So knowing the sha1 of the object
> +and the approximate area of the corruption, I used the `sha1-munge`
> +program below to brute-force the correct byte.
> +
> +Here's the inflate program (it's essentially `gunzip` but without the
> +`.gz` header processing):
> +
> +--------------------------
> +#include <stdio.h>
> +#include <string.h>
> +#include <zlib.h>
> +#include <stdlib.h>
> +
> +int main(int argc, char **argv)
> +{
> +	/*
> +	 * oversized so we can read the whole buffer in;
> +	 * this could actually be switched to streaming
> +	 * to avoid any memory limitations
> +	 */
> +	static unsigned char buf[25 * 1024 * 1024];
> +	static unsigned char out[25 * 1024 * 1024];
> +	int len;
> +	z_stream z;
> +	int ret;
> +
> +	len = read(0, buf, sizeof(buf));
> +	memset(&z, 0, sizeof(z));
> +	inflateInit(&z);
> +
> +	z.next_in = buf;
> +	z.avail_in = len;
> +	z.next_out = out;
> +	z.avail_out = sizeof(out);
> +
> +	ret = inflate(&z, 0);
> +	if (ret != Z_OK && ret != Z_STREAM_END)
> +		fprintf(stderr, "initial inflate failed (%d)\n", ret);
> +
> +	fprintf(stderr, "outputting %lu bytes", z.total_out);
> +	fwrite(out, 1, z.total_out, stdout);
> +	return 0;
> +}
> +--------------------------
> +
> +And here is the `sha1-munge` program:
> +
> +--------------------------
> +#include <stdio.h>
> +#include <unistd.h>
> +#include <string.h>
> +#include <signal.h>
> +#include <openssl/sha.h>
> +#include <stdlib.h>
> +
> +/* eye candy */
> +static int counter = 0;
> +static void progress(int sig)
> +{
> +	fprintf(stderr, "\r%d", counter);
> +	alarm(1);
> +}
> +
> +static const signed char hexval_table[256] = {
> +	 -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1,		/* 00-07 */
> +	 -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1,		/* 08-0f */
> +	 -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1,		/* 10-17 */
> +	 -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1,		/* 18-1f */
> +	 -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1,		/* 20-27 */
> +	 -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1,		/* 28-2f */
> +	  0,  1,  2,  3,  4,  5,  6,  7,		/* 30-37 */
> +	  8,  9, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1,		/* 38-3f */
> +	 -1, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, -1,		/* 40-47 */
> +	 -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1,		/* 48-4f */
> +	 -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1,		/* 50-57 */
> +	 -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1,		/* 58-5f */
> +	 -1, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, -1,		/* 60-67 */
> +	 -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1,		/* 68-67 */
> +	 -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1,		/* 70-77 */
> +	 -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1,		/* 78-7f */
> +	 -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1,		/* 80-87 */
> +	 -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1,		/* 88-8f */
> +	 -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1,		/* 90-97 */
> +	 -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1,		/* 98-9f */
> +	 -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1,		/* a0-a7 */
> +	 -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1,		/* a8-af */
> +	 -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1,		/* b0-b7 */
> +	 -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1,		/* b8-bf */
> +	 -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1,		/* c0-c7 */
> +	 -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1,		/* c8-cf */
> +	 -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1,		/* d0-d7 */
> +	 -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1,		/* d8-df */
> +	 -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1,		/* e0-e7 */
> +	 -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1,		/* e8-ef */
> +	 -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1,		/* f0-f7 */
> +	 -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1,		/* f8-ff */
> +};
> +
> +static inline unsigned int hexval(unsigned char c)
> +{
> +return hexval_table[c];
> +}
> +
> +static int get_sha1_hex(const char *hex, unsigned char *sha1)
> +{
> +	int i;
> +	for (i = 0; i < 20; i++) {
> +		unsigned int val;
> +		/*
> +		 * hex[1]=='\0' is caught when val is checked below,
> +		 * but if hex[0] is NUL we have to avoid reading
> +		 * past the end of the string:
> +		 */
> +		if (!hex[0])
> +			return -1;
> +		val = (hexval(hex[0]) << 4) | hexval(hex[1]);
> +		if (val & ~0xff)
> +			return -1;
> +		*sha1++ = val;
> +		hex += 2;
> +	}
> +	return 0;
> +}
> +
> +int main(int argc, char **argv)
> +{
> +	/* oversized so we can read the whole buffer in */
> +	static unsigned char buf[25 * 1024 * 1024];
> +	char header[32];
> +	int header_len;
> +	unsigned char have[20], want[20];
> +	int start, len;
> +	SHA_CTX orig;
> +	unsigned i, j;
> +
> +	if (!argv[1] || get_sha1_hex(argv[1], want)) {
> +		fprintf(stderr, "usage: sha1-munge <sha1> [start] <file.in\n");
> +		return 1;
> +	}
> +
> +	if (argv[2])
> +		start = atoi(argv[2]);
> +	else
> +		start = 0;
> +
> +	len = read(0, buf, sizeof(buf));
> +	header_len = sprintf(header, "blob %d", len) + 1;
> +	fprintf(stderr, "using header: %s\n", header);
> +
> +	/*
> +	 * We keep a running sha1 so that if you are munging
> +	 * near the end of the file, we do not have to re-sha1
> +	 * the unchanged earlier bytes
> +	 */
> +	SHA1_Init(&orig);
> +	SHA1_Update(&orig, header, header_len);
> +	if (start)
> +		SHA1_Update(&orig, buf, start);
> +
> +	signal(SIGALRM, progress);
> +	alarm(1);
> +
> +	for (i = start; i < len; i++) {
> +		unsigned char c;
> +		SHA_CTX x;
> +
> +#if 0
> +		/*
> +		 * deletion -- this would not actually work in practice,
> +		 * I think, because we've already committed to a
> +		 * particular size in the header. Ditto for addition
> +		 * below. In those cases, you'd have to do the whole
> +		 * sha1 from scratch, or possibly keep three running
> +		 * "orig" sha1 computations going.
> +		 */
> +		memcpy(&x, &orig, sizeof(x));
> +		SHA1_Update(&x, buf + i + 1, len - i - 1);
> +		SHA1_Final(have, &x);
> +		if (!memcmp(have, want, 20))
> +			printf("i=%d, deletion\n", i);
> +#endif
> +
> +		/*
> +		 * replacement -- note that this tries each of the 256
> +		 * possible bytes. If you suspect a single-bit flip,
> +		 * it would be much shorter to just try the 8
> +		 * bit-flipped variants.
> +		 */
> +		c = buf[i];
> +		for (j = 0; j <= 0xff; j++) {
> +			buf[i] = j;
> +
> +			memcpy(&x, &orig, sizeof(x));
> +			SHA1_Update(&x, buf + i, len - i);
> +			SHA1_Final(have, &x);
> +			if (!memcmp(have, want, 20))
> +				printf("i=%d, j=%02x\n", i, j);
> +		}
> +		buf[i] = c;
> +
> +#if 0
> +		/* addition */
> +		for (j = 0; j <= 0xff; j++) {
> +			unsigned char extra = j;
> +			memcpy(&x, &orig, sizeof(x));
> +			SHA1_Update(&x, &extra, 1);
> +			SHA1_Update(&x, buf + i, len - i);
> +			SHA1_Final(have, &x);
> +			if (!memcmp(have, want, 20))
> +				printf("i=%d, addition=%02x", i, j);
> +		}
> +#endif
> +
> +		SHA1_Update(&orig, buf + i, 1);
> +		counter++;
> +	}
> +
> +	alarm(0);
> +	fprintf(stderr, "\r%d\n", counter);
> +	return 0;
> +}
> +--------------------------
Previous: Jeff KingNext: Jeff King
Message 15 of 16 in “pack corruption post-mortem”
  1. Jeff KingOct 16, 2013
  2. Duy NguyenOct 16, 2013
  3. Martin FickOct 16, 2013
  4. Jeff KingOct 17, 2013
  5. Junio C HamanoOct 17, 2013
  6. Jeff KingOct 25, 2013
  7. Duy NguyenOct 17, 2013
  8. Duy NguyenOct 19, 2013
  9. Nicolas PitreOct 19, 2013
  10. Shawn PearceOct 19, 2013
  11. Nicolas PitreOct 20, 2013
  12. Duy NguyenOct 20, 2013
  13. Nicolas PitreOct 20, 2013
  14. howto: document more tools for recovery corruptionJeff King, Apr 1, 2015
  15. Junio C HamanoApr 1, 2015
  16. Jeff KingApr 2, 2015

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