Re: NIST's policy: sha-1 until 2010, after 2010 sha-2.
- From
David Symonds <dsymonds@gmail.com>
- Date
- Dec 29, 2007, 04:45 UTC
- Message-ID
- <ee77f5c20712282045ha230f42n3e68477229deb199@mail.gmail.com>
- In-Reply-To
- <998d0e4a0712282027y6e625141jcef90bd38fb83b75@mail.gmail.com>
On Dec 29, 2007 3:27 PM, J.C. Pizarro <jcpiza@gmail.com> wrote:
Show 6 quoted lines
> Dear Linus Torvalds, > > What do you think to do when your git has to change from SHA-1 to SHA-2 > because of the weaker collision-resistance of SHA-1 in the next years? > > (e.g. from an damn developer trying to commit a collisioned-SHA-1 file)
It's a non-issue. The closest-to-practical attack method on SHA-1 is a collision-finding attack, not a second pre-image attack, which means you can find two messages with the same hash. As far as I know, there's no significant weakness known for finding a pre-image, which would be the most practical way of weakening Git's "security" via SHA-1 substitution.
Regardless, the use of SHA-1 in Git isn't primarily for security, though it is a nice side-effect. The SHA-1 is there for reliability in addressing and as a good hash.
Dave.