Re: Can Git repos be hacked or otherwise manipulated?

From: 1234dev <1234dev@protonmail.com>
Date: Jan 15, 2020, 03:18 UTC
Message-ID: <bvMqhQOr4uENl8j2zcFOY0ogJmUqTRofCGyPlPc_xaXQXSP5ds9lgdglXkjTZng9U5WSpo-Uc2_SzCTdpAvLTeruT-tW3GTDkWj9dfLznuM=@protonmail.com>
In-Reply-To: <20200114220826.GB3957260@coredump.intra.peff.net>

Hello Jeff and thank you for your response!

To work around this problem, should we instead host this repo on a public service? If so which one would you recommend?

--Jonathan

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‐‐‐‐‐‐‐ Original Message ‐‐‐‐‐‐‐ On Tuesday, January 14, 2020 10:08 PM, Jeff King <peff@peff.net> wrote:

Show 21 quoted lines

> On Tue, Jan 14, 2020 at 02:48:05PM +0000, 1234dev wrote:
>
> > Let's say you're working with a team of elite hackers, passing a
> > tarball of a Git repo back and forth as you complete your mission. Now
> > let's say one of them has malicious intent. What are the possibilities
> > that he or she can, for instance, hide changes made to a script or
> > binary that does something malicious if executed? Or perhaps maybe
> > there are other such scenarios one should be made aware of?
>
> It is absolutely not safe to run Git commands from a tarball of an
> untrusted repo. There are many ways to execute arbitrary code specified
> by a config option, and you'd be getting recipients .git/config.
> Likewise for hooks.
>
> And while we would consider it a bug if you can trigger a memory error
> by reading a corrupted or malicious on-disk file, that's gotten way
> less auditing than the code paths which take in objects from a remote.
> So e.g., I would not be surprised if there are vulnerabilities that
> could cause out-of-bounds reads of a corrupted .git/index.
>
> -Peff