Re: [RFC] Malicously tampering git metadata?
On Thu, Jan 14, 2016 at 9:16 AM, Santiago Torres <santiago@nyu.edu> wrote:
Show 22 quoted lines
> Hello Stefan, thanks for your feedback again.
>
>> This is what push certs ought to solve already?
>
> Yes, they aim to solve the same issue. Unfortunately, push certificates
> don't solve all posible scenarios of metadata manipulation (e.g., a
> malicious server changing branch pointers to trick a user into merging
> unwanted changes).
>
>> AFAIU the main issue with untrustworthy servers is holding back the latest push.
>> As Ted said, usually there is problem in the code and then the fix is pushed,
>> but the malicious server would not advertise the update, but deliver the old
>> unfixed version.
>>
>> This attack cannot be mitigated by having either a side channel (email
>> announcements)
>> or time outs (state is only good if push cert is newer than <amount of
>> time>, but this may
>> require empty pushes)
>>
>
> I'm sorry, did you mean to say "can"?
Yes, formulating that sentence took a while and I did not proofread it.
Stefan Beller <sbeller@google.com>