Re: Re: [PATCH v2] config: preserve config file permissions on edits

> Am 5/6/2014 2:17, schrieb Eric Wong:
>> Users may already store sensitive data such as imap.pass in
>> ..git/config; making the file world-readable when "git config"
>> is called to edit means their password would be compromised
>> on a shared system.
>>
>> [v2: updated for section renames, as noted by Junio]
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Eric Wong <normalperson@yhbt.net>
>> ---
>>  config.c               | 16 ++++++++++++++++
>>  t/t1300-repo-config.sh | 10 ++++++++++
>>  2 files changed, 26 insertions(+)
>>
>> diff --git a/config.c b/config.c
>> index a30cb5c..c227aa8 100644
>> --- a/config.c
>> +++ b/config.c
>> @@ -1636,6 +1636,13 @@ int git_config_set_multivar_in_file(const char *config_filename,
>>                       MAP_PRIVATE, in_fd, 0);
>>               close(in_fd);
>>
>> +             if (fchmod(fd, st.st_mode & 07777) < 0) {
>> +                     error("fchmod on %s failed: %s",
>> +                             lock->filename, strerror(errno));
>> +                     ret = CONFIG_NO_WRITE;
>> +                     goto out_free;
>> +             }
>
> This introduces a severe failure in the Windows port because we do not
> implement fchmod. Existing fchmod invocations do not check the return
> value, and they are only interested in removing the write bits, and we
> generally don't care a lot if files remain writable.
>
> I'm not proficient enough to add any ACL fiddling to fchmod that would be
> required by the above change, whose purpose is to be strict about
> permissions. Nor am I interested (who the heck is sharing a Windows box
> anyway? ;-)
>
> Therefore, here's just a work-around patch to keep things going on
> Windows. Any opinions from the Windows corner?
>