Re: [Outreachy PATCH] doc: clarify promisor remote fetch ordering
- From
- Wasswa Edson <edsonwasswa54@gmail.com>
- Date
- Oct 25, 2026, 23:35 UTC
- Message-ID
- <CA+ew3Ju1N0bCFkTzrop5+ckNCrgGWRzMcrLHu7DAYufzw7Gncg@mail.gmail.com>
- In-Reply-To
- <xmqq5wythc57.fsf@gitster.g>
Thanks so much about that but if i look into the codebase, Your concern is valid from a security perspective, but the implementation already has safeguards that prevent arbitrary injection Then about the Git server my say is a No, coz a server cannot arbitrarily inject a brand-new, untrusted promisor remote onto a client by default. The client must explicitly configure acceptance policies before any server-advertised remote will be accepted. If I am wrong let me be guided. I am re-doing the patch again following the doc you have provided Thank you
On Thu, 22 Oct 2026 at 20:35, Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com> wrote:
Show 50 quoted lines
> > Wasswa Edson <edsonwasswa54@gmail.com> writes: > > > From fe5f35b00eafa1eb2756178445d3e88c4e9d6787 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 > > From: Edson <edsonwasswa54@gmail.com> > > Date: Thu, 22 Oct 2026 13:09:21 +0300 > > Subject: [PATCH] doc: clarify promisor remote fetch ordering > > None of the above should be included in the e-mailed patch. Your > MUA would record your name in the "From:" header, the commit title > in the "Subject:" header, and the date when the public first saw > this contribution from you in the "Date:" header, which should > become the author date recorded in the project history. > > On the other hand, there needs to be an explanation to convince > the project that it should want this change before your sign-off. > > > Signed-off-by: Edson <edsonwasswa54@gmail.com> > > See Documentation/SubmittingPatches [[dco]] and [[real-name]]. > > > diff --git a/Documentation/technical/partial-clone.adoc > > b/Documentation/technical/partial-clone.adoc > > index 18718a3840..a1104930fb 100644 > > --- a/Documentation/technical/partial-clone.adoc > > +++ b/Documentation/technical/partial-clone.adoc > > @@ -196,6 +196,11 @@ filtered `git-fetch` commands from the central server. > > > > When fetching objects, promisor remotes are tried one after the other > > until all the objects have been fetched. > > +When a server advertises promisor remotes via the protocol v2 > > +"promisor-remote" capability and the client accepts them (see > > +linkgit:gitprotocol-v2[5]), those accepted remotes are tried first. > > +After trying the accepted remotes, Git then tries the other configured > > +promisor remotes as described below. > > Just fact checking. > > I thought that a remote Git server cannot arbitrarily inject, > advertise, or force a brand-new, untrusted promisor remote config > onto a client during a protocol exchange (such as a standard git > fetch or git clone) if the client doesn't already have it configured > locally. But the above description makes it sound as if the server > can advertise a remote repository that the client does not know or > care about and direct the client to go there first. Is that true > (yes, I am wondering if there is a security implication around > here)? > > Thanks. >