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Re: [PATCH] commit.c: ensure strchrnul() doesn't scan beyond range

From
René Scharfe <l.s.r@web.de>
Date
Feb 8, 2024, 18:31 UTC
Message-ID
<8313d9d6-f6bd-4fae-be9c-e7a8129768eb@web.de>
In-Reply-To
<20240208010040.GB1059751@coredump.intra.peff.net>
Am 08.02.24 um 02:00 schrieb Jeff King:
Show 29 quoted lines
> On Mon, Feb 05, 2024 at 08:57:46PM +0100, René Scharfe wrote:
>
>> If you want to make the code work with buffers that lack a terminating
>> NUL then you need to replace the strchrnul() call with something that
>> respects buffer lengths.  You could e.g. call memchr().  Don't forget
>> to check for NUL to preserve the original behavior.  Or you could roll
>> your own custom replacement, perhaps like this:
>
> I'm not sure it is worth retaining the check for NUL. The original
> function added by me in fe6eb7f2c5 (commit: provide a function to find a
> header in a buffer, 2014-08-27) just took a NUL-terminated string, so
> we certainly were not expecting embedded NULs.
>
> In cfc5cf428b (receive-pack.c: consolidate find header logic,
> 2022-01-06) we switched to taking the "len" parameter, but the new
> caller just passes strlen(msg) anyway.
>
> I guess you could argue that before that commit, receive-pack.c's
> find_header() which took a length was buggy to use strchrnul(). It gets
> fed with a push-cert buffer. I guess it's possible for there to be an
> embedded NUL there, but in practice there shouldn't be. If we are
> thinking of malformed or malicious input, it's not clear which behavior
> (finding or not finding a header past a NUL) is more harmful. So all
> things being equal, I would try to reduce the number of special cases
> here by not worrying about NULs.
>
> (Though if somebody really wants to dig, it's possible there's a clever
> dual-parser attack here where "\nfoo\0bar baz" finds the header "bar
> baz" in one parser but not in another).

Good point. A _mem function shouldn't worry about NULs. Its callers are responsible for that -- if necessary.

No idea what an attacker could do with nonce and push-option headers with varying visibility. Version detection? Something worse?

But anyway: If NULs are of no concern and we currently end parsing when we see one in all cases, why do we need a _mem function at all? The original version of the function, find_commit_header(), should suffice. check_nonce() could be run against the NUL-terminated sigcheck.payload and check_cert_push_options() parses an entire strbuf, so there is no risk of out-of-bounds access.

René
Previous: Jeff KingNext: Junio C Hamano
Message 5 of 13 in “commit.c: ensure strchrnul() doesn't scan beyond range”
  1. commit.c: ensure strchrnul() doesn't scan beyond rangeChandra Pratap via GitGitGadget, Feb 5, 2024
  2. René ScharfeFeb 5, 2024
  3. Junio C HamanoFeb 6, 2024
  4. Jeff KingFeb 8, 2024
  5. René ScharfeFeb 8, 2024
  6. Junio C HamanoFeb 8, 2024
  7. Kyle LippincottFeb 8, 2024
  8. Jeff KingFeb 8, 2024
  9. Junio C HamanoFeb 8, 2024
  10. Kyle LippincottFeb 6, 2024
  11. commit.c: ensure find_header_mem() doesn't scan beyond given rangeChandra Pratap via GitGitGadget, Feb 7, 2024
  12. René ScharfeFeb 7, 2024
  13. Junio C HamanoFeb 7, 2024

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