Re: [PATCH] merge/pull: verify GPG signatures of commits being merged
- From
Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
- Date
- Mar 23, 2013, 03:08 UTC
- Message-ID
- <7vvc8i4xtm.fsf@alter.siamese.dyndns.org>
- In-Reply-To
- <20130322231430.GK12223@google.com>
Jonathan Nieder <jrnieder@gmail.com> writes:
Show 10 quoted lines
>> git merge/pull: >> When --verify-signatures is specified on the command-line of git-merge >> or git-pull, check whether the commits being merged have good gpg >> signatures and abort the merge in case they do not. This allows e.g. >> auto-deployment from untrusted repo hosts. > > This leaves me pretty nervous. Is there an argument to pass in to > specify a keyring with public keys to trust? Without that, it is > presumably using ~/.gnupg/trustdb.gpg, which is about trust of > identity rather than trust to provide code to run on my machine. :(
I think people who create a real merge via "git pull" and use that as "auto-deployment" mechanism is insane, but presumably that "auto" tells us some other things, like it will be done by non-human account, its $HOME/.gnupg would contain only the keyring that is for the auto deployer, or the cronscript that runs "git pull" can set GNUPGHOME and export it before doing so.
So, I wouldn't be worried about it too much.