Re: Shared repositories no longer securable against privilege escalation

From: Jakub Narębski <jnareb@gmail.com>
Date: Mar 18, 2017, 19:32 UTC
Message-ID: <726ef4cf-db9e-991b-5df5-168c7e9a41f6@gmail.com>
In-Reply-To: <148977072642.2144.7040206366650087348@richardiv.omgwallhack.org>

W dniu 17.03.2017 o 18:12, Joe Rayhawk pisze:

> Quoting Michael Haggerty (2017-03-17 05:07:36)

Show 13 quoted lines

>>
>> Thanks for the report. This is indeed a problem for people who want to
>> set restrictive privileges on $GIT_DIR. I'd never thought of that use
>> case, but it makes sense. Is this practice recommended somewhere or
>> required by any Git hosting tools? (I'm curious how prevalent it is.)
> 
> I had to work out the practice for my own management engine; I have
> since deployed it to around eight different mixed-use multi-user
> operations, the most significant of which is Freedesktop.org.
> 
> Without this practice, core.sharedRepository is an enormous liability
> of a feature. I can't speak to whether anyone but me ever noticed, what
> with mixed-use multi-user POSIX environments becoming increasingly rare.

Is there a reason why you rely on file permissions and user groups to enforce access control, instead of using public-key based solution such as Gitolite?

-- 
Jakub Narębski