Re: [PATCH] setup: support GIT_IGNORE_INSECURE_OWNER environment variable
- From
- Phillip Wood <phillip.wood123@gmail.com>
- Date
- Jun 28, 2024, 09:35 UTC
- Message-ID
- <27cadffb-ca3f-487d-86b7-3508c45c446d@gmail.com>
- In-Reply-To
- <xmqqpls2v1zx.fsf@gitster.g>
On 27/06/2024 16:28, Junio C Hamano wrote:
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> Phillip Wood <phillip.wood123@gmail.com> writes: > >> On 26/06/2024 19:11, Junio C Hamano wrote: >>> Phillip Wood <phillip.wood123@gmail.com> writes: >>> >>>> To expand an this a little - a couple of times I've wanted to checkout >>>> a bare repository that is owned by a different user. It is a pain to >>>> have to add a new config setting just for a one-off checkout. Being >>>> able to adjust the config on the command line would be very useful in >>>> that case. >>> True. As long as it is deemed safe to honor the one-off "git -c >>> safe.directory=..." from the command line, for the purpose of this >>> "I who am running this 'git' process hereby declare that I trust >>> this and that repository", I think it would be the best solution >>> for the "git daemon" use case. >> >> This actually works already, the behavior was changed in 6061601d9f >> (safe.directory: use git_protected_config(), 2022-07-14). The reason I >> thought it didn't work was that I remember it failing on Debian >> bullseye a few months ago but that used an older version of git. There >> is some more rationale for the change in 779ea9303a7 (Documentation: >> define protected configuration, 2022-07-14) > > Thanks. > > So, does this more or less conclude the episode about how best to > deal with the 2.45.1 regression that Florian's patch in this thread > started?
I think so yes
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> It seems that we already have enough mechanisms to help > users tweak their existing set-up, so we may not need code changes, > but I am wondering if we want to add a bit of documentation around > safe.directory to tell them when it makes sense to set it, what > value(s) they would want to set it to, etc. > > * For "git daemon" invocations, because we know the command is run > after chdir to a directory with '.' specified as the repository, > we recommend to have safe.directory=., either on the command line > with "-c var=val" or in daemon user's ~/.gitconfig, in the > "git-daemon" help page? We could recommend safe.directory=*, but > they would mean the same thing in the context of running "git > daemon".
I think we'd be better to fix the safe.directory check as you suggest below if we can but failing that updating the documentation would certainly help.
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> We may want to discuss who protects from whom with the > safe.directory mechanism and git-daemon-export-ok mechanism. The > former is "the daemon trusts that repositories won't harm the > daemon user", while the latter is "the repository owner is OK for > it to be published".
Yes that would be helpful
> Also optionally, we may update the code to take the absolute path > of the repository before passing it to the safe.directory check.
I think doing this would be more helpful than updating the documentation to recommend adding "safe.directory=.". If we do this we would also want to convert "//" -> "/" in the config keys as we've been forcing users to add paths like "/srv/git//my-repo" if the --base-path argument to git-daemon ended with a "/"
> * For "http-backend" invocations, we should think about potential > additions that would help users, similar to what I listed above > for "git daemon".
That sounds sensible.
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> Having said all that, I do not think I mind GIT_SAFE_DIRECTORIES > that is a ":" separated list of paths that is honored just like the > multi-valued configuration variable safe.directory. Once an > attacker can influence your environment variables, it already is > game over, so trusting it does not make the attack surface any > worse.
Indeed in that case the attacker can influence the path that we read the protected config from by setting $HOME (and do far worse by setting $PATH)
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> As Peff explained, we can trigger the more general "git -c > var=val" mechanism by exporting a set of environment variables, so > such a specialized environment variable is not strictly needed, but > it would make writing the "SetEnv" directive in apache configuration > (and similar ones for other HTTP server implementations) slighly > simpler and a lot more straight-forward.
Yes having to set all the GIT_CONFIG_* variables can be rather confusing
Best Wishes
Phillip