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[PATCH v2 4/9] cache-tree: avoid strtol() on non-string buffer

From
Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Date
Nov 18, 2025, 09:12 UTC
Message-ID
<20251118091218.GD529192@coredump.intra.peff.net>
In-Reply-To
<20251118091127.GA4175601@coredump.intra.peff.net>
A cache-tree extension entry in the index looks like this:
  <name> NUL <entry_nr> SPACE <subtree_nr> NEWLINE <binary_oid>

where the "_nr" items are human-readable base-10 ASCII. We parse them with strtol(), even though we do not have a NUL-terminated string (we'd generally have an mmap() of the on-disk index file). For a well-formed entry, this is not a problem; strtol() will stop when it sees the newline. But there are two problems:

  1. A corrupted entry could omit the newline, causing us to read
     further. You'd mostly get stopped by seeing non-digits in the oid
     field (and if it is likewise truncated, there will still be 20 or
     more bytes of the index checksum). So it's possible, though
     unlikely, to read off the end of the mmap'd buffer. Of course a
     malicious index file can fake the oid and the index checksum to all
     (ASCII) 0's.
     This is further complicated by the fact that mmap'd buffers tend to
     be zero-padded up to the page boundary. So to run off the end, the
     index size also has to be a multiple of the page size. This is also
     unlikely, though you can construct a malicious index file that
     matches this.
     The security implications aren't too interesting. The index file is
     a local file anyway (so you can't attack somebody by cloning, but
     only if you convince them to operate in a .git directory you made,
     at which point attacking .git/config is much easier). And it's just
     a read overflow via strtol(), which is unlikely to buy you much
     beyond a crash.
  2. ASan has a strict_string_checks option, which tells it to make sure
     that options to string functions (like strtol) have some eventual
     NUL, without regard to what the function would actually do (like
     stopping at a newline here). This option sometimes has false
     positives, but it can point to sketchy areas (like this one) where
     the input we use doesn't exhibit a problem, but different input
     _could_ cause us to misbehave.

Let's fix it by just parsing the values ourselves with a helper function that is careful not to go past the end of the buffer. There are a few behavior changes here that should not matter:

  - We do not consider overflow, as strtol() would. But nor did the
    original code. However, we don't trust the value we get from the
    on-disk file, and if it says to read 2^30 entries, we would notice
    that we do not have that many and bail before reading off the end of
    the buffer.
  - Our helper does not skip past extra leading whitespace as strtol()
    would, but according to gitformat-index(5) there should not be any.
  - The original quit parsing at a newline or a NUL byte, but now we
    insist on a newline (which is what the documentation says, and what
    Git has always produced).

Since we are providing our own helper function, we can tweak the interface a bit to make our lives easier. The original code does not use strtol's "end" pointer to find the end of the parsed data, but rather uses a separate loop to advance our "buf" pointer to the trailing newline. We can instead provide a helper that advances "buf" as it parses, letting us read strictly left-to-right through the buffer.

I didn't add a new test here. It's surprisingly difficult to construct an index of exactly the right size due to the way we pad entries. But it is easy to trigger the problem in existing tests when using ASan's strict string checking, coupled with a recent change to use NO_MMAP with ASan builds. So:

  make SANITIZE=address
  cd t
  ASAN_OPTIONS=strict_string_checks=1 ./t0090-cache-tree.sh

triggers it reliably. Technically it is not deterministic because there is ~8% chance (it's 1-(255/256)^20, or ^32 for sha256) that the trailing checksum hash has a NUL byte in it. But we compute enough cache-trees in the course of that script that we are very likely to hit the problem in one of them.

We can look at making strict_string_checks the default for ASan builds, but there are some other cases we'd want to fix first.

Reported-by: correctmost <cmlists@sent.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
---
 cache-tree.c | 50 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------
 1 file changed, 37 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
diff --git a/cache-tree.c b/cache-tree.c
index 2aba47060e..2d8947b518 100644
--- a/cache-tree.c
+++ b/cache-tree.c
@@ -548,12 +548,41 @@ void cache_tree_write(struct strbuf *sb, struct cache_tree *root)
 	trace2_region_leave("cache_tree", "write", the_repository);
 }
 
+static int parse_int(const char **ptr, unsigned long *len_p, int *out)
+{
+	const char *s = *ptr;
+	unsigned long len = *len_p;
+	int ret = 0;
+	int sign = 1;
+
+	while (len && *s == '-') {
+		sign *= -1;
+		s++;
+		len--;
+	}
+
+	while (len) {
+		if (!isdigit(*s))
+			break;
+		ret *= 10;
+		ret += *s - '0';
+		s++;
+		len--;
+	}
+
+	if (s == *ptr)
+		return -1;
+
+	*ptr = s;
+	*len_p = len;
+	*out = sign * ret;
+	return 0;
+}
+
 static struct cache_tree *read_one(const char **buffer, unsigned long *size_p)
 {
 	const char *buf = *buffer;
 	unsigned long size = *size_p;
-	const char *cp;
-	char *ep;
 	struct cache_tree *it;
 	int i, subtree_nr;
 	const unsigned rawsz = the_hash_algo->rawsz;
@@ -569,19 +598,14 @@ static struct cache_tree *read_one(const char **buffer, unsigned long *size_p)
 	buf++; size--;
 	it = cache_tree();
 
-	cp = buf;
-	it->entry_count = strtol(cp, &ep, 10);
-	if (cp == ep)
+	if (parse_int(&buf, &size, &it->entry_count) < 0)
 		goto free_return;
-	cp = ep;
-	subtree_nr = strtol(cp, &ep, 10);
-	if (cp == ep)
+	if (!size || *buf != ' ')
 		goto free_return;
-	while (size && *buf && *buf != '\n') {
-		size--;
-		buf++;
-	}
-	if (!size)
+	buf++; size--;
+	if (parse_int(&buf, &size, &subtree_nr) < 0)
+		goto free_return;
+	if (!size || *buf != '\n')
 		goto free_return;
 	buf++; size--;
 	if (0 <= it->entry_count) {
-- 
2.52.0.278.gadc6434dc3
Previous: Jeff KingNext: Phillip Wood
Message 36 of 64 in “asan bonanza”
  1. 0/9 asan bonanzaJeff King, Nov 12, 2025
  2. 1/9 compat/mmap: mark unused argument in git_munmap()Jeff King, Nov 12, 2025
  3. 2/9 pack-bitmap: handle name-hash lookups in incremental bitmapsJeff King, Nov 12, 2025
  4. Patrick SteinhardtNov 12, 2025
  5. Taylor BlauNov 13, 2025
  6. Jeff KingNov 18, 2025
  7. 3/9 Makefile: turn on NO_MMAP when building with ASanJeff King, Nov 12, 2025
  8. Collin FunkNov 12, 2025
  9. Jeff KingNov 12, 2025
  10. Collin FunkNov 12, 2025
  11. Patrick SteinhardtNov 12, 2025
  12. Taylor BlauNov 13, 2025
  13. Patrick SteinhardtNov 13, 2025
  14. Jeff KingNov 18, 2025
  15. Junio C HamanoNov 13, 2025
  16. Patrick SteinhardtNov 14, 2025
  17. Jeff KingNov 15, 2025
  18. 4/9 cache-tree: avoid strtol() on non-string bufferJeff King, Nov 12, 2025
  19. Patrick SteinhardtNov 12, 2025
  20. Taylor BlauNov 13, 2025
  21. Jeff KingNov 18, 2025
  22. Jeff KingNov 18, 2025
  23. 5/9 fsck: assert newline presence in fsck_ident()Jeff King, Nov 12, 2025
  24. 6/9 fsck: avoid strcspn() in fsck_ident()Jeff King, Nov 12, 2025
  25. 7/9 fsck: remove redundant date timestamp checkJeff King, Nov 12, 2025
  26. 8/9 fsck: avoid parse_timestamp() on buffer that isn't NUL-terminatedJeff King, Nov 12, 2025
  27. Patrick SteinhardtNov 12, 2025
  28. Junio C HamanoNov 12, 2025
  29. Jeff KingNov 15, 2025
  30. 9/9 t: enable ASan's strict_string_checks optionJeff King, Nov 12, 2025
  31. Taylor BlauNov 13, 2025
  32. 0/9 asan bonanzaJeff King, Nov 18, 2025
  33. 1/9 compat/mmap: mark unused argument in git_munmap()Jeff King, Nov 18, 2025
  34. 2/9 pack-bitmap: handle name-hash lookups in incremental bitmapsJeff King, Nov 18, 2025
  35. 3/9 Makefile: turn on NO_MMAP when building with ASanJeff King, Nov 18, 2025
  36. 4/9 cache-tree: avoid strtol() on non-string bufferJeff King, Nov 18, 2025
  37. Phillip WoodNov 18, 2025
  38. Junio C HamanoNov 23, 2025
  39. Phillip WoodNov 23, 2025
  40. Junio C HamanoNov 23, 2025
  41. Jeff KingNov 24, 2025
  42. Junio C HamanoNov 24, 2025
  43. Jeff KingNov 26, 2025
  44. Junio C HamanoNov 26, 2025
  45. 0/4 more robust functions for parsing int from bufJeff King, Nov 30, 2025
  46. 1/4 parse: prefer bool to int for boolean returnsJeff King, Nov 30, 2025
  47. Patrick SteinhardtDec 4, 2025
  48. 2/4 parse: add functions for parsing from non-string buffersJeff King, Nov 30, 2025
  49. my complaints with clarJeff King, Nov 30, 2025
  50. Phillip WoodDec 1, 2025
  51. Patrick SteinhardtDec 4, 2025
  52. Jeff KingDec 5, 2025
  53. Patrick SteinhardtDec 4, 2025
  54. Phillip WoodDec 5, 2025
  55. Junio C HamanoJan 20, 2026
  56. Jeff KingJan 21, 2026
  57. 3/4 cache-tree: use parse_int_from_buf()Jeff King, Nov 30, 2025
  58. 4/4 fsck: use parse_unsigned_from_buf() for parsing timestampJeff King, Nov 30, 2025
  59. 5/9 fsck: assert newline presence in fsck_ident()Jeff King, Nov 18, 2025
  60. 6/9 fsck: avoid strcspn() in fsck_ident()Jeff King, Nov 18, 2025
  61. 7/9 fsck: remove redundant date timestamp checkJeff King, Nov 18, 2025
  62. 8/9 fsck: avoid parse_timestamp() on buffer that isn't NUL-terminatedJeff King, Nov 18, 2025
  63. 9/9 t: enable ASan's strict_string_checks optionJeff King, Nov 18, 2025
  64. Junio C HamanoNov 23, 2025

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