[PATCH 0/1] Restore the ability to clone repositories owned by another user

For a long time, we've told users that the only safe way to operate on an untrusted repository is to clone or fetch from it. We've even mentioned this policy in a variety of places in our documentation.

However, f4aa8c8bb1 ("fetch/clone: detect dubious ownership of local repositories", 2024-04-10), this changed in an attempt to make things more secure. That broke a lot of user use cases, which have been reported to the list.

Because our security model hasn't changed and it's still safe to clone or fetch from an untrusted repository, let's revert a portion of that change to allow us to clone and fetch from repositories owned by a different user. If a malicious repository were a problem for upload-pack, that would probably also be exploitable on major forges, and if it were a problem on the client side, then we'd also have a problem with untrusted HTTPS remotes, so we're not really adding any security risk here.

This matter was discussed extensively in the thread starting at https://lore.kernel.org/git/ZqUc8DJ1uKcHYlcy@imp.flyn.org/.

Note that I haven't signed off on this patch because it's based on one from Junio and I haven't gotten his sign-off yet. It's fine to add mine once he's added his.

brian m. carlson (1):
  Allow cloning from repositories owned by another user

 Documentation/git-clone.txt   |  9 +++++++++
 builtin/upload-pack.c         |  5 ++++-
 daemon.c                      |  6 ++++--
 path.c                        | 10 ++++++----
 path.h                        | 17 ++++++++++++++++-
 t/t0411-clone-from-partial.sh |  3 ---
 t/t5605-clone-local.sh        | 10 ++++++++++
 7 files changed, 49 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)