Re: [PATCH 2/4] trace2: redact passwords from https:// URLs by default

From: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Date: Nov 27, 2023, 21:50 UTC
Message-ID: <20231127215052.GD87495@coredump.intra.peff.net>
In-Reply-To: <CABPp-BELjVqVEB3oVx3fMzmvNfE1f7muLR_2k912_C+SaQtZtg@mail.gmail.com>

On Thu, Nov 23, 2023 at 10:59:20AM -0800, Elijah Newren wrote:

Show 10 quoted lines

> > Let's at least avoid logging such secrets via Trace2, much like we avoid
> > logging secrets in `http.c`. Much like the code in `http.c` is guarded
> > via `GIT_TRACE_REDACT` (defaulting to `true`), we guard the new code via
> > `GIT_TRACE2_REDACT` (also defaulting to `true`).
> 
> Training users is hard.  I appreciate the changes here to make trace2
> not be a leak vector, but is it time to perhaps consider bigger safety
> measures: At the clone/fetch level, automatically warn loudly whenever
> such a URL is provided, accompanied with a note that in the future it
> will be turned into a hard error?

Yes, the password in such a case ends up in the plaintext .git/config file, which is not great.

There's some discussion and patches here:

  https://lore.kernel.org/git/nycvar.QRO.7.76.6.1905172121130.46@tvgsbejvaqbjf.bet/

I meant to follow up on them, but never did.

-Peff