[PATCH 0/3] quarantine-push loose ends

From: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Date: Apr 10, 2017, 22:10 UTC
Message-ID: <20170410221058.2ao64wedg2pa6uc2@sigill.intra.peff.net>

On Mon, Apr 10, 2017 at 05:14:24PM -0400, Jeff King wrote:

Show 8 quoted lines

> > Also, I think this whole thing could really do with some documentation
> > in githooks(5). E.g. what hooks does it apply for? The test is just
> > for pre-receive but the patch changes run_update_hook(), does it also
> > take effect for update? Ditto the caveat about update-ref.
> 
> My thinking was that the cases where the effects were user-visible were
> sufficiently insane that nobody would need to know or care when the
> feature was in use.

I guess it can't hurt to write about it, though. Here's that, plus a cleanup on the stray tmp_objdir_env() call you noticed. The final patch provides some safety for the ref-update case. My assumption all along has been that nobody would want to update random refs from inside the pre-receive hook. This doubles down on that by making it forbidden. I don't think that's a big loss, because doing so now is extremely dangerous. If that assumption is wrong, the correct path forward is to make the quarantining configurable.

  [1/3]: receive-pack: drop tmp_objdir_env from run_update_hook
  [2/3]: receive-pack: document user-visible quarantine effects
  [3/3]: refs: reject ref updates while GIT_QUARANTINE_PATH is set

 Documentation/git-receive-pack.txt | 29 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 Documentation/githooks.txt         |  3 +++
 builtin/receive-pack.c             |  1 -
 refs.c                             |  6 ++++++
 t/t5547-push-quarantine.sh         | 11 +++++++++++
 5 files changed, 49 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)