[PATCH 1/3] credential-cache--daemon: refactor check_socket_directory
- From
Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
- Date
- Feb 23, 2016, 07:15 UTC
- Message-ID
- <20160223071515.GA8395@sigill.intra.peff.net>
- In-Reply-To
- <20160223071427.GA7489@sigill.intra.peff.net>
From: Jon Griffiths <jon_p_griffiths@yahoo.com>
This function does an early return, and therefore has to repeat its cleanup. We can stick the later bit of the function into an "else" and avoid duplicating the shared part (which will get bigger in a future patch).
Let's also rename the function to init_socket_directory. It not only checks the directory but also creates it. Saying "init" is more accurate.
Signed-off-by: Jon Griffiths <jon_p_griffiths@yahoo.com> Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net> --- credential-cache--daemon.c | 28 +++++++++++++--------------- 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
diff --git a/credential-cache--daemon.c b/credential-cache--daemon.c index cc65a9c..3403f48 100644 --- a/credential-cache--daemon.c +++ b/credential-cache--daemon.c @@ -215,7 +215,7 @@ static const char permissions_advice[] = "users may be able to read your cached credentials. Consider running:\n" "\n" " chmod 0700 %s"; -static void check_socket_directory(const char *path) +static void init_socket_directory(const char *path) { struct stat st; char *path_copy = xstrdup(path); @@ -224,20 +224,18 @@ static void check_socket_directory(const char *path) if (!stat(dir, &st)) { if (st.st_mode & 077) die(permissions_advice, dir); - free(path_copy); - return; + } else { + /* + * We must be sure to create the directory with the correct mode, + * not just chmod it after the fact; otherwise, there is a race + * condition in which somebody can chdir to it, sleep, then try to open + * our protected socket. + */ + if (safe_create_leading_directories_const(dir) < 0) + die_errno("unable to create directories for '%s'", dir); + if (mkdir(dir, 0700) < 0) + die_errno("unable to mkdir '%s'", dir); } - - /* - * We must be sure to create the directory with the correct mode, - * not just chmod it after the fact; otherwise, there is a race - * condition in which somebody can chdir to it, sleep, then try to open - * our protected socket. - */ - if (safe_create_leading_directories_const(dir) < 0) - die_errno("unable to create directories for '%s'", dir); - if (mkdir(dir, 0700) < 0) - die_errno("unable to mkdir '%s'", dir); free(path_copy); } @@ -264,7 +262,7 @@ int main(int argc, const char **argv) if (!socket_path) usage_with_options(usage, options); - check_socket_directory(socket_path); + init_socket_directory(socket_path); register_tempfile(&socket_file, socket_path); if (ignore_sighup)
-- 2.7.2.645.g4e1306c