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Re: [PATCH] strbuf: stop out-of-boundary warnings from Coverity

From
Duy Nguyen <pclouds@gmail.com>
Date
Jun 18, 2015, 10:13 UTC
Message-ID
<20150618101353.GA6525@lanh>
In-Reply-To
<20150617191235.GB25304@peff.net>
On Wed, Jun 17, 2015 at 03:12:35PM -0400, Jeff King wrote:
Show 14 quoted lines
> On Wed, Jun 17, 2015 at 10:58:10AM -0700, Stefan Beller wrote:
> 
> > > Just make strbuf_slopbuf[] large enough to keep Coverity happy. If it's
> > > happy, we'll have cleaner defect list
> > 
> > It's down 31 defects, roughly 10% of all things coverity detected as
> > problematic.
> > YAY!
> 
> That's a good thing.  I do find the solution a little gross, though. I
> wonder if there is a way we can tell coverity more about how strbuf
> works. I've noticed similar problems with string_list, where it
> complains that we are touching list->items, which was assigned to NULL
> (of course it was, but then after that we did string_list_append!).

There's "function modeling" where you write simplified (and likely incorrect) version of a function to correct how coverity's understanding of that function. I searched, there's no "data modeling". I think I have the user manual, but haven't looked through it yet.

On Thu, Jun 18, 2015 at 2:25 AM, Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com> wrote:
> I actually think this is too ugly to live.
Well, I have another option below. Let's see how people feel about it.
> If coverity is buggy and unusable, why aren't we raising that issue
> to them?

It's technically correct though. The key point here is strbuf_slopbuf[0] is NUL, but that cannot be statically determined. And we may also need to teach it about strcmp' and friends' semantics. That's probably too much for a static analyzer.

The last resort is simply filter out a whole class of warnings. Probably good enough if both patches look equally ugly.

-- 8< --
Subject: [PATCH] strbuf: kill strbuf_slopbuf, in favor of ""

A lot of "out-of-bound access" warnings on scan.coverity.com is because it does not realize this strbuf_slopbuf[] is in fact initialized with a single and promised to never change. But that promise could be broken if some caller attempts to write to strbuf->buf[0] write after STRBUF_INIT.

We really can't do much about it. But we can try to put strbuf_slopbuf
in .rodata section, where writes will be caught by the OS with memory
protection support. The only drawback is people can't do
"buf->buf == strbuf_slopbuf" any more. Luckily nobody does that in the
current code base.
---
 strbuf.c | 19 ++++++-------------
 strbuf.h | 11 ++++++++---
 2 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
diff --git a/strbuf.c b/strbuf.c
index 0d4f4e5..9f91229 100644
--- a/strbuf.c
+++ b/strbuf.c
@@ -11,17 +11,10 @@ int starts_with(const char *str, const char *prefix)
 			return 0;
 }
 
-/*
- * Used as the default ->buf value, so that people can always assume
- * buf is non NULL and ->buf is NUL terminated even for a freshly
- * initialized strbuf.
- */
-char strbuf_slopbuf[1];
-
 void strbuf_init(struct strbuf *sb, size_t hint)
 {
 	sb->alloc = sb->len = 0;
-	sb->buf = strbuf_slopbuf;
+	sb->buf = (char*)"";
 	if (hint)
 		strbuf_grow(sb, hint);
 }
@@ -52,7 +45,7 @@ void strbuf_attach(struct strbuf *sb, void *buf, size_t len, size_t alloc)
 	sb->len   = len;
 	sb->alloc = alloc;
 	strbuf_grow(sb, 0);
-	sb->buf[sb->len] = '\0';
+	strbuf_terminate(sb);
 }
 
 void strbuf_grow(struct strbuf *sb, size_t extra)
@@ -77,7 +70,7 @@ void strbuf_rtrim(struct strbuf *sb)
 {
 	while (sb->len > 0 && isspace((unsigned char)sb->buf[sb->len - 1]))
 		sb->len--;
-	sb->buf[sb->len] = '\0';
+	strbuf_terminate(sb);
 }
 
 void strbuf_ltrim(struct strbuf *sb)
@@ -88,7 +81,7 @@ void strbuf_ltrim(struct strbuf *sb)
 		sb->len--;
 	}
 	memmove(sb->buf, b, sb->len);
-	sb->buf[sb->len] = '\0';
+	strbuf_terminate(sb);
 }
 
 int strbuf_reencode(struct strbuf *sb, const char *from, const char *to)
@@ -380,7 +373,7 @@ ssize_t strbuf_read(struct strbuf *sb, int fd, size_t hint)
 		strbuf_grow(sb, 8192);
 	}
 
-	sb->buf[sb->len] = '\0';
+	strbuf_terminate(sb);
 	return sb->len - oldlen;
 }
 
@@ -496,7 +489,7 @@ int strbuf_getwholeline(struct strbuf *sb, FILE *fp, int term)
 	if (ch == EOF && sb->len == 0)
 		return EOF;
 
-	sb->buf[sb->len] = '\0';
+	strbuf_terminate(sb);
 	return 0;
 }
 #endif
diff --git a/strbuf.h b/strbuf.h
index 01c5c63..d8346ee 100644
--- a/strbuf.h
+++ b/strbuf.h
@@ -67,8 +67,13 @@ struct strbuf {
 	char *buf;
 };
 
-extern char strbuf_slopbuf[];
-#define STRBUF_INIT  { 0, 0, strbuf_slopbuf }
+#define STRBUF_INIT  { 0, 0, (char*)"" }
+
+static inline void strbuf_terminate(struct strbuf *sb)
+{
+	if (sb->buf[sb->len])
+		sb->buf[sb->len] = '\0';
+}
 
 /**
  * Life Cycle Functions
@@ -149,7 +154,7 @@ static inline void strbuf_setlen(struct strbuf *sb, size_t len)
 	if (len > (sb->alloc ? sb->alloc - 1 : 0))
 		die("BUG: strbuf_setlen() beyond buffer");
 	sb->len = len;
-	sb->buf[len] = '\0';
+	strbuf_terminate(sb);
 }
 
 /**
-- 
2.3.0.rc1.137.g477eb31
-- 8< --
-- 
Duy
Previous: Stefan BellerNext: Junio C Hamano
Message 6 of 13 in “strbuf: stop out-of-boundary warnings from Coverity”
  1. strbuf: stop out-of-boundary warnings from CoverityNguyễn Thái Ngọc Duy, Jun 17, 2015
  2. Stefan BellerJun 17, 2015
  3. Stefan BellerJun 17, 2015
  4. Jeff KingJun 17, 2015
  5. Stefan BellerJun 17, 2015
  6. Duy NguyenJun 18, 2015
  7. Junio C HamanoJun 18, 2015
  8. Duy NguyenJun 19, 2015
  9. Remi Galan AlfonsoJun 19, 2015
  10. Duy NguyenJun 19, 2015
  11. Junio C HamanoJun 19, 2015
  12. Junio C HamanoJun 17, 2015
  13. Stefan BellerJun 17, 2015

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