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Re: Lack of detached signatures

From
Ted Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Date
Sep 29, 2011, 01:59 UTC
Message-ID
<20110929015919.GL19250@thunk.org>
In-Reply-To
<7vd3ekxkca.fsf@alter.siamese.dyndns.org>
On Wed, Sep 28, 2011 at 05:28:53PM -0700, Junio C Hamano wrote:
> 
> I suspect that letting GPG do the compression and shipping foo.tar.gpg
> would work just fine as well,

Good point. If only "tar -xW foo.tar.gpg" automatically verified the gpg signature, that would work really well indeed. :-)

Show 6 quoted lines
> I understand that the automated GPG signature k.org used to use on the
> master machine was primarily to protect the copies that the mirrors serve
> from getting tampered after they leave the master machine. Do you happen
> to know what the new policy will be? Will the developers who distribute
> their snapshot tarballs from the site be GPG signing them themselves
> before uploading?

This is still being negotiated. Given that developers are starting to sign their release tags (and of course Linus has been doing this already), one of the things that I've proposed is that we support is to have the developer do something like this:

git archive --format=tar -o e2fsprogs-1.41.12.tar v1.41.12 gzip -9n e2fsprogs-1.41.12.tar gpg --sign --detach -a e2fsprogs-1.41.12.tar.gz

and then just uploading the tar.gz.gpg file, the URL for the git tree, and the tag that the server should use do the extraction.

Show 5 quoted lines
> That would improve the situation (I suspect that there
> were some people who misunderstood that these GPG signature were to
> protect against break-in at the master machine), but at the same time, it
> may create the chicken-and-egg bootstrapping problem if public keys of too
> many people need to be published securely.

We are in the process of bootstrapping a GPG web of trust. Linus has generated a new GPG key which has been signed by Peter Anvin, Dirk, and myself. We'll get a much richer set of cross signatures at the Kernel Summit in Prague in a few months.

Also, there's a pretty good intersection between kernel developers and the Debian web of trust; there's been some talk of using that as an auxiliary bootstrap for isolated kernel developers in distant part of the world.

					- Ted
Previous: Junio C HamanoNext: Junio C Hamano
Message 13 of 24 in “Lack of detached signatures”
  1. Joseph ParmeleeSep 27, 2011
  2. Junio C HamanoSep 28, 2011
  3. Michael WittenSep 28, 2011
  4. Olsen, Alan RSep 28, 2011
  5. Carlos Martín NietoSep 28, 2011
  6. Joseph ParmeleeSep 28, 2011
  7. Junio C HamanoSep 28, 2011
  8. Michael WittenSep 28, 2011
  9. Matthieu MoySep 28, 2011
  10. Jeff KingSep 28, 2011
  11. Ted Ts'oSep 28, 2011
  12. Junio C HamanoSep 29, 2011
  13. Ted Ts'oSep 29, 2011
  14. Junio C HamanoSep 29, 2011
  15. Ted Ts'oSep 29, 2011
  16. Sverre RabbelierSep 29, 2011
  17. Ted Ts'oSep 29, 2011
  18. Sverre RabbelierSep 29, 2011
  19. Joseph ParmeleeSep 29, 2011
  20. Joseph ParmeleeSep 29, 2011
  21. Jeff KingSep 29, 2011
  22. Olsen, Alan RSep 29, 2011
  23. Joseph ParmeleeSep 28, 2011
  24. Ben WaltonSep 28, 2011

Read the whole thread, see it on lore, or plain text.

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