Re: Linux 3.1-rc5

From: Henrique de Moraes Holschuh <hmh@hmh.eng.br>
Date: Sep 7, 2011, 01:37 UTC
Message-ID: <20110907013750.GA25150@khazad-dum.debian.net>
In-Reply-To: <4E65307F.5020103@redhat.com>

On Mon, 05 Sep 2011, Mauro Carvalho Chehab wrote:

> It would be great if "git remote update" could also verify the tag
> signature (if present), as most of us just do a "git remote update".

That helps, and it really should be all that matter for a power-end-user that just wants to build his kernel from a git tree.

However, one can still try to trick someone to base the tree he's going to use for a future pull request on a tree with a rogue commit, in order to try to get the rogue commit into mainline through an indirect path, for example.

Yeah, it is very obvious, and not a real major point of concern around
LKML: we all check the diff, log or shortlog between the tree we're
offering upstream to pull from) and the current upstream tree for any
stray commits after all (if only to avoid embarassing mistakes).   And
upstream does his/her own checks before keeping the merged tree, and so
forth.

It's just that the security of the kernel source trees are not a simple consequence of how git works: the workflow matters. I feel that point deserves to be stressed every once in a while, however obvious it might be.

-- 
  "One disk to rule them all, One disk to find them. One disk to bring
  them all and in the darkness grind them. In the Land of Redmond
  where the shadows lie." -- The Silicon Valley Tarot
  Henrique Holschuh