Re: [PATCH] Allow aliases to expand to shell commands
- From
Shawn O. Pearce <spearce@spearce.org>
- Date
- Feb 12, 2007, 06:53 UTC
- Message-ID
- <20070212065319.GF699@spearce.org>
- In-Reply-To
- <20070212035613.GA18010@thunk.org>
Theodore Tso <tytso@mit.edu> wrote:
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> On Sun, Feb 11, 2007 at 01:44:25PM -0800, Junio C Hamano wrote: > > Theodore Tso <tytso@mit.edu> writes: > > > > > ..., I think we're > > > still safe, since aliases can't override commands. > > > > I feel a bit uneasy to hear safety argument based on that > > current restriction, since we might want to loosen it later. > > Loosen which restriction? > > 1) The ability for aliases to shadow existing git commands?
This one.
Show 12 quoted lines
> 2) The ability for untrusted users to make arbitrary changes to the > config file? > 3) The ability for untrusted users to execute arbitrary git commands via > git-shell? > > You hjave to loosen at least 2 of the 3 current restrictions before > the ability to execute shell commands out of aliases becomes a problem > --- and I would argue that either (2) or (3) are things that we would > be insane to loosen at least to the point of allowing untrusted users > to make arbitrary changes to the config or execute arbitrary git > commands, since even today, they could do a huge amount of damage > already.
I agree, 2 and 3 are the real issue here, not 1. 1 is only an issue for scripts which expect the plumbing to behave a certain way, but doesn't, as the user has aliased the plumbing command.
-- Shawn.