Re: fix mktemp (remove mktemp ;)

On Sat, Apr 16, 2005 at 05:02:21PM -0700, Paul Jackson wrote:
 > > And racy. And not guaranteed to come up with fresh new files.
 > 
 > In theory perhaps.  In practice no.
 > 
 > Even mktemp(1) can collide, in theory, since there is no practical way
 > in shell scripts to hold open and locked the file from the instant of it
 > is determined to be a unique name.

Using the pid as a 'random' number is a bad idea. all an attacker has to do is create 65535 symlinks in /usr/tmp, and he can now overwrite any file you own.

mktemp is being used here to provide randomness in the filename, not just a uniqueness.

 > The window of vulnerability for shell script tmp files is the lifetime
 > of the script - while the file sits there unlocked.  Anyone else with
 > permissions can mess with it.

Attacker doesnt need to touch the script. Just take advantage of flaws in it, and wait for someone to run it.

 > More people will fail, and are already failing, using mktemp than I have
 > ever seen using $$ (I've never seen a documented case, and since such
 > files are not writable to other user accounts, such a collision would
 > typically not go hidden.)
 > 
 > Fast, simple portable solutions that work win over solutions with some
 > theoretical advantage that don't matter in practice, but also that are
 > less portable or less efficient.

I'd suggest fixing your distributions mktemp over going with an inferior solution.

		Dave