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[PATCH v2 16/19] receive-pack: GPG-validate push certificates

From
Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
Date
Aug 22, 2014, 20:30 UTC
Message-ID
<1408739424-31429-17-git-send-email-gitster@pobox.com>
In-Reply-To
<1408739424-31429-1-git-send-email-gitster@pobox.com>

Reusing the GPG signature check helpers we already have, verify the signature in receive-pack and give the results to the hooks via GIT_PUSH_CERT_{SIGNER,KEY,STATUS} environment variables.

Policy decisions, such as accepting or rejecting a good signature by a key that is not fully trusted, is left to the hook and kept outside of the core.

Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
---
 Documentation/git-receive-pack.txt | 27 ++++++++++++++++++++++-----
 builtin/receive-pack.c             | 29 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 t/t5534-push-signed.sh             | 18 ++++++++++++++++--
 3 files changed, 67 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
diff --git a/Documentation/git-receive-pack.txt b/Documentation/git-receive-pack.txt
index 6c458af..60151a6 100644
--- a/Documentation/git-receive-pack.txt
+++ b/Documentation/git-receive-pack.txt
@@ -56,7 +56,21 @@ sha1-old and sha1-new should be valid objects in the repository.
 When accepting a signed push (see linkgit:git-push[1]), the signed
 push certificate is stored in a blob and an environment variable
 `GIT_PUSH_CERT` can be consulted for its object name.  See the
-description of `post-receive` hook for an example.
+description of `post-receive` hook for an example.  In addition, the
+certificate is verified using GPG and the result is exported with
+the following environment variables:
+
+GIT_PUSH_CERT_SIGNER::
+	The name and the e-mail address of the owner of the key that
+	signed the push certificate.
+
+GIT_PUSH_CERT_KEY::
+	The GPG key ID of the key that signed the push certificate.
+
+GIT_PUSH_CERT_STATUS::
+	The status of GPG verification of the push certificate,
+	using the same mnemonic as used in `%G?` format of `git log`
+	family of commands (see linkgit:git-log[1]).
 
 This hook is called before any refname is updated and before any
 fast-forward checks are performed.
@@ -106,13 +120,14 @@ the update.  Refs that were created will have sha1-old equal to
 0\{40}, otherwise sha1-old and sha1-new should be valid objects in
 the repository.
 
-The `GIT_PUSH_CERT` environment variable can be inspected, just as
+The `GIT_PUSH_CERT*` environment variables can be inspected, just as
 in `pre-receive` hook, after accepting a signed push.
 
 Using this hook, it is easy to generate mails describing the updates
 to the repository.  This example script sends one mail message per
 ref listing the commits pushed to the repository, and logs the push
-certificates of signed pushes to a file:
+certificates of signed pushes with good signatures to a logger
+service:
 
 	#!/bin/sh
 	# mail out commit update information.
@@ -129,9 +144,11 @@ certificates of signed pushes to a file:
 		mail -s "Changes to ref $ref" commit-list@mydomain
 	done
 	# log signed push certificate, if any
-	if test -n "${GIT_PUSH_CERT-}"
+	if test -n "${GIT_PUSH_CERT-}" && test ${GIT_PUSH_CERT_STATUS} = G
 	then
-		git cat-file blob ${GIT_PUSH_CERT} >>/var/log/push-log
+		(
+			git cat-file blob ${GIT_PUSH_CERT}
+		) | mail -s "push from $GIT_PUSH_CERT_SIGNER" push-log@mydomain
 	fi
 	exit 0
 
diff --git a/builtin/receive-pack.c b/builtin/receive-pack.c
index f30df8a..abdc296 100644
--- a/builtin/receive-pack.c
+++ b/builtin/receive-pack.c
@@ -15,6 +15,8 @@
 #include "connected.h"
 #include "argv-array.h"
 #include "version.h"
+#include "tag.h"
+#include "gpg-interface.h"
 
 static const char receive_pack_usage[] = "git receive-pack <git-dir>";
 
@@ -48,6 +50,7 @@ static int shallow_update;
 static const char *alt_shallow_file;
 static struct strbuf push_cert = STRBUF_INIT;
 static unsigned char push_cert_sha1[20];
+static struct signature_check sigcheck;
 
 static enum deny_action parse_deny_action(const char *var, const char *value)
 {
@@ -260,12 +263,38 @@ static void prepare_push_cert_sha1(struct child_process *proc)
 	struct argv_array env = ARGV_ARRAY_INIT;
 
 	if (!already_done) {
+		struct strbuf gpg_output = STRBUF_INIT;
+		struct strbuf gpg_status = STRBUF_INIT;
+		int bogs /* beginning_of_gpg_sig */;
+
 		already_done = 1;
 		if (write_sha1_file(push_cert.buf, push_cert.len, "blob", push_cert_sha1))
 			hashclr(push_cert_sha1);
+
+		memset(&sigcheck, '\0', sizeof(sigcheck));
+		sigcheck.result = 'N';
+
+		bogs = parse_signature(push_cert.buf, push_cert.len);
+		if (verify_signed_buffer(push_cert.buf, bogs,
+					 push_cert.buf + bogs, push_cert.len - bogs,
+					 &gpg_output, &gpg_status) < 0) {
+			; /* error running gpg */
+		} else {
+			sigcheck.payload = push_cert.buf;
+			sigcheck.gpg_output = gpg_output.buf;
+			sigcheck.gpg_status = gpg_status.buf;
+			parse_gpg_output(&sigcheck);
+		}
+
+		strbuf_release(&gpg_output);
+		strbuf_release(&gpg_status);
 	}
 	if (!is_null_sha1(push_cert_sha1)) {
 		argv_array_pushf(&env, "GIT_PUSH_CERT=%s", sha1_to_hex(push_cert_sha1));
+		argv_array_pushf(&env, "GIT_PUSH_CERT_SIGNER=%s", sigcheck.signer);
+		argv_array_pushf(&env, "GIT_PUSH_CERT_KEY=%s", sigcheck.key);
+		argv_array_pushf(&env, "GIT_PUSH_CERT_STATUS=%c", sigcheck.result);
+
 		proc->env = env.argv;
 	}
 }
diff --git a/t/t5534-push-signed.sh b/t/t5534-push-signed.sh
index 0eb5004..659bca0 100755
--- a/t/t5534-push-signed.sh
+++ b/t/t5534-push-signed.sh
@@ -52,12 +52,26 @@ test_expect_success GPG 'signed push sends push certificate' '
 	if test -n "${GIT_PUSH_CERT-}"
 	then
 		git cat-file blob $GIT_PUSH_CERT >../push-cert
-	fi
+	fi &&
+
+	cat >../push-cert-status <<E_O_F
+	SIGNER=${GIT_PUSH_CERT_SIGNER-nobody}
+	KEY=${GIT_PUSH_CERT_KEY-nokey}
+	STATUS=${GIT_PUSH_CERT_STATUS-nostatus}
+	E_O_F
+
+	EOF
+
+	cat >expect <<-\EOF &&
+	SIGNER=C O Mitter <committer@example.com>
+	KEY=13B6F51ECDDE430D
+	STATUS=G
 	EOF
 
 	git push --signed dst noop ff +noff &&
 	grep "$(git rev-parse noop ff) refs/heads/ff" dst/push-cert &&
-	grep "$(git rev-parse noop noff) refs/heads/noff" dst/push-cert
+	grep "$(git rev-parse noop noff) refs/heads/noff" dst/push-cert &&
+	test_cmp expect dst/push-cert-status
 '
 
 test_done
-- 
2.1.0-304-g950f846
Previous: Junio C HamanoNext: Junio C Hamano
Message 17 of 23 in “Signed push”
  1. 00/19 Signed pushJunio C Hamano, Aug 22, 2014
  2. 01/19 receive-pack: do not overallocate command structureJunio C Hamano, Aug 22, 2014
  3. 02/19 receive-pack: parse feature request a bit earlierJunio C Hamano, Aug 22, 2014
  4. 03/19 receive-pack: do not reuse old_sha1[] for other thingsJunio C Hamano, Aug 22, 2014
  5. 04/19 receive-pack: factor out queueing of commandJunio C Hamano, Aug 22, 2014
  6. 05/19 send-pack: move REF_STATUS_REJECT_NODELETE logic a bit higherJunio C Hamano, Aug 22, 2014
  7. 06/19 send-pack: refactor decision to send update per refJunio C Hamano, Aug 22, 2014
  8. 07/19 send-pack: always send capabilitiesJunio C Hamano, Aug 22, 2014
  9. 08/19 send-pack: factor out capability string generationJunio C Hamano, Aug 22, 2014
  10. 09/19 send-pack: rename "new_refs" to "need_pack_data"Junio C Hamano, Aug 22, 2014
  11. 10/19 send-pack: refactor inspecting and resetting status and sending commandsJunio C Hamano, Aug 22, 2014
  12. 11/19 send-pack: clarify that cmds_sent is a booleanJunio C Hamano, Aug 22, 2014
  13. 12/19 gpg-interface: move parse_gpg_output() to where it should beJunio C Hamano, Aug 22, 2014
  14. 13/19 gpg-interface: move parse_signature() to where it should beJunio C Hamano, Aug 22, 2014
  15. 14/19 pack-protocol doc: typofix for PKT-LINEJunio C Hamano, Aug 22, 2014
  16. 15/19 the beginning of the signed pushJunio C Hamano, Aug 22, 2014
  17. 16/19 receive-pack: GPG-validate push certificatesJunio C Hamano, Aug 22, 2014
  18. 17/19 send-pack: send feature request on push-cert packetJunio C Hamano, Aug 22, 2014
  19. 18/19 signed push: remove duplicated protocol infoJunio C Hamano, Aug 22, 2014
  20. 19/19 signed push: fortify against replay attacksJunio C Hamano, Aug 22, 2014
  21. Eric SunshineAug 24, 2014
  22. Stefan BellerAug 30, 2014
  23. Junio C HamanoSep 2, 2014

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