threads / patch / 58687

patchapply: reject patches larger than ~1 GiB

Subject: [PATCH] apply: reject patches larger than ~1 GiB

## tl;dr

2 messages between Oct 25, 2022 and Oct 26, 2022. Diffs are folded; open one to read it.

replies: 1people: 2as markdown or json

Taylor Blau· Oct 25, 2022, 18:24 UTC · lore

The apply code is not prepared to handle extremely large files. It uses "int" in some places, and "unsigned long" in others.

This combination leads to unfortunate problems when switching between the two types. Using "int" prevents us from handling large files, since large offsets will wrap around and spill into small negative values, which can result in wrong behavior (like accessing the patch buffer with a negative offset).

Converting from "unsigned long" to "int" also has truncation problems even on LLP64 platforms where "long" is the same size as "int", since the former is unsigned but the latter is not.

To avoid potential overflow and truncation issues in `git apply`, apply similar treatment as in dcd1742e56 (xdiff: reject files larger than ~1GB, 2015-09-24), where the xdiff code was taught to reject large files for similar reasons.

The maximum size was chosen somewhat arbitrarily, but picking a value just shy of a gigabyte allows us to double it without overflowing 2^31-1 (after which point our value would wrap around to a negative number). To give ourselves a bit of extra margin, the maximum patch size is a MiB smaller than a full GiB, which gives us some slop in case we allocate "(records + 1) * sizeof(int)" or similar.

Luckily, the security implications of these conversion issues are relatively uninteresting, because a victim needs to be convinced to apply a malicious patch.

Reported-by: 정재우 <thebound7@gmail.com>
Suggested-by: Johannes Schindelin <Johannes.Schindelin@gmx.de>
Signed-off-by: Taylor Blau <me@ttaylorr.com>
---
 apply.c                    | 12 +++++++++++-
 t/t4141-apply-too-large.sh | 23 +++++++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 34 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
 create mode 100755 t/t4141-apply-too-large.sh
Show changes to 2 files +34 −1

apply.c, t/t4141-apply-too-large.sh

diff --git a/apply.c b/apply.c
index 2b7cd930ef..850604c191 100644
--- a/apply.c
+++ b/apply.c
@@ -386,9 +386,19 @@ static void say_patch_name(FILE *output, const char *fmt, struct patch *patch)
 
 #define SLOP (16)
 
+/*
+ * apply.c isn't equipped to handle arbitrarily large patches, because
+ * it intermingles `unsigned long` with `int` for the type used to store
+ * buffer lengths.
+ *
+ * Only process patches that are just shy of 1 GiB large in order to
+ * avoid any truncation or overflow issues.
+ */
+#define MAX_APPLY_SIZE (1024UL * 1024 * 1023)
+
 static int read_patch_file(struct strbuf *sb, int fd)
 {
-	if (strbuf_read(sb, fd, 0) < 0)
+	if (strbuf_read(sb, fd, 0) < 0 || sb->len >= MAX_APPLY_SIZE)
 		return error_errno("git apply: failed to read");
 
 	/*
diff --git a/t/t4141-apply-too-large.sh b/t/t4141-apply-too-large.sh
new file mode 100755
index 0000000000..58742d4fc5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/t/t4141-apply-too-large.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+#!/bin/sh
+
+test_description='git apply with too-large patch'
+
+TEST_PASSES_SANITIZE_LEAK=true
+. ./test-lib.sh
+
+test_expect_success EXPENSIVE 'git apply rejects patches that are too large' '
+	sz=$((1024 * 1024 * 1023)) &&
+	{
+		cat <<-\EOF &&
+		diff --git a/file b/file
+		new file mode 100644
+		--- /dev/null
+		+++ b/file
+		@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+		EOF
+		test-tool genzeros
+	} | test_copy_bytes $sz | test_must_fail git apply 2>err &&
+	grep "git apply: failed to read" err
+'
+
+test_done
-- 
2.38.0.16.g393fd4c6db
Jeff King· Oct 26, 2022, 05:55 UTC · re: Taylor Blau · lore

Re: [PATCH] apply: reject patches larger than ~1 GiB

On Tue, Oct 25, 2022 at 02:24:31PM -0400, Taylor Blau wrote:
> To avoid potential overflow and truncation issues in `git apply`, apply
> similar treatment as in dcd1742e56 (xdiff: reject files larger than
> ~1GB, 2015-09-24), where the xdiff code was taught to reject large
> files for similar reasons.

I think this is a reasonable stopgap measure. In the case of xdiff, we knew that we were working with text files. Is that always true here, though? I.e., after this patch are we blocked from handling a 1GB binary diff patch?

I'm mostly asking from a devil's advocate position. Even if the answer is yes, I think this may still be the right thing to do, at least in the short term.

Show 6 quoted lines
> The maximum size was chosen somewhat arbitrarily, but picking a value
> just shy of a gigabyte allows us to double it without overflowing 2^31-1
> (after which point our value would wrap around to a negative number).
> To give ourselves a bit of extra margin, the maximum patch size is a MiB
> smaller than a full GiB, which gives us some slop in case we allocate
> "(records + 1) * sizeof(int)" or similar.

This was eerily familiar, and I wondered what "records" meant in apply.c. But that is just the example from xdiff. :) I agree that the same "extra margin" argument makes sense here, just out of caution.

Show 15 quoted lines
> +/*
> + * apply.c isn't equipped to handle arbitrarily large patches, because
> + * it intermingles `unsigned long` with `int` for the type used to store
> + * buffer lengths.
> + *
> + * Only process patches that are just shy of 1 GiB large in order to
> + * avoid any truncation or overflow issues.
> + */
> +#define MAX_APPLY_SIZE (1024UL * 1024 * 1023)
> +
>  static int read_patch_file(struct strbuf *sb, int fd)
>  {
> -	if (strbuf_read(sb, fd, 0) < 0)
> +	if (strbuf_read(sb, fd, 0) < 0 || sb->len >= MAX_APPLY_SIZE)
>  		return error_errno("git apply: failed to read");

The patch itself looks reasonable. We'll potentially allocate an unbounded amount of RAM before rejecting the patch, but there's not an easy fix there without teaching strbuf_read() to accept a maximum.

It's probably not worth worrying about given the attack surface here (it's not like anybody is reading patches from a socket that will cause a DoS).

-Peff

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