threads / patch / 58488

patchci: restrict workflow's github token permissions

Subject: [PATCH] ci: restrict workflow's github token permissions

## tl;dr

2 messages between Sep 22, 2022 and Sep 22, 2022. Diffs are folded; open one to read it.

replies: 1people: 2as markdown or json

Alex via GitGitGadget· Sep 22, 2022, 07:27 UTC · lore
From: sashashura <aleksandrosansan@gmail.com>
Currently the workflow runs with the following permissions:
GITHUB_TOKEN Permissions
  Actions: write
  Checks: write
  Contents: write
  Deployments: write
  Discussions: write
  Issues: write
  Metadata: read
  Packages: write
  Pages: write
  PullRequests: write
  RepositoryProjects: write
  SecurityEvents: write
  Statuses: write
Signed-off-by: sashashura <aleksandrosansan@gmail.com>
---
    ci: restrict workflow's github token permissions
    
    This PR adds explicit permissions section
    [https://docs.github.com/en/actions/using-workflows/workflow-syntax-for-github-actions#permissions]
    to workflows. This is a security best practice because by default
    workflows run with extended set of permissions
    [https://docs.github.com/en/actions/security-guides/automatic-token-authentication#permissions-for-the-github_token]
    (except from on: pull_request from external forks
    [https://securitylab.github.com/research/github-actions-preventing-pwn-requests/]).
    By specifying any permission explicitly all others are set to none. By
    using the principle of least privilege the damage a compromised workflow
    can do (because of an injection
    [https://securitylab.github.com/research/github-actions-untrusted-input/]
    or compromised third party tool or action) is restricted. It is
    recommended to have most strict permissions on the top level
    [https://github.com/ossf/scorecard/blob/main/docs/checks.md#token-permissions]
    and grant write permissions on job level
    [https://docs.github.com/en/actions/using-jobs/assigning-permissions-to-jobs]
    case by case.
    
    check-whitespace.yml is triggered by pull_request only and receives
    restricted token already. l10n.yml has permissions on job level already.
    So I didn't make any changes to them. In both cases it is possible to
    add explicit global lever permissions just for consistency if you
    prefer. Let me know.
    
    Currently
    [https://github.com/git/git/actions/runs/3100948073/jobs/5021781329] the
    workflow runs with the following permissions: GITHUB_TOKEN Permissions
    Actions: write Checks: write Contents: write Deployments: write
    Discussions: write Issues: write Metadata: read Packages: write Pages:
    write PullRequests: write RepositoryProjects: write SecurityEvents:
    write Statuses: write
Published-As: https://github.com/gitgitgadget/git/releases/tag/pr-git-1337%2Fsashashura%2Fpatch-2-v1
Fetch-It-Via: git fetch https://github.com/gitgitgadget/git pr-git-1337/sashashura/patch-2-v1
Pull-Request: https://github.com/git/git/pull/1337
 .github/workflows/main.yml | 6 ++++++
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
Show changes to .github/workflows/main.yml +6 −0
diff --git a/.github/workflows/main.yml b/.github/workflows/main.yml
index 831f4df56c5..3ce9302c589 100644
--- a/.github/workflows/main.yml
+++ b/.github/workflows/main.yml
@@ -5,8 +5,14 @@ on: [push, pull_request]
 env:
   DEVELOPER: 1
 
+permissions:
+  contents: read
+
 jobs:
   ci-config:
+    permissions:
+      contents: read
+      actions: read # for github.actions.getWorkflowRun
     name: config
     runs-on: ubuntu-latest
     outputs:

base-commit: dda7228a83e2e9ff584bf6adbf55910565b41e14
-- 
gitgitgadget
Phillip Wood· Sep 22, 2022, 15:29 UTC · re: Alex via GitGitGadget · lore

Re: [PATCH] ci: restrict workflow's github token permissions

Hi Alex
On 22/09/2022 08:27, Alex via GitGitGadget wrote:
Show 17 quoted lines
> From: sashashura <aleksandrosansan@gmail.com>
> 
> Currently the workflow runs with the following permissions:
> GITHUB_TOKEN Permissions
>    Actions: write
>    Checks: write
>    Contents: write
>    Deployments: write
>    Discussions: write
>    Issues: write
>    Metadata: read
>    Packages: write
>    Pages: write
>    PullRequests: write
>    RepositoryProjects: write
>    SecurityEvents: write
>    Statuses: write

Thanks for working on this. On the face of it restricting the permissions sounds like a good idea but unfortunately the commit message does not explain the reasoning for the change being made or the implications of the change. Some of the notes below the '---' line should be rewritten into the commit message to explain the change. I would also be helpful to briefly explain why we don't need any of these permissions. I'm not familiar with github's permissions model so it's hard to judge if this is a sensible change. It is not clear to me what all the permissions mean - does write permission control writing to my fork when I run a ci job or something else? Our ci scripts do cache some state between jobs so we can skip running the tests if the tree is unchanged, it's not clear if that is affected by this change.

Best Wishes
Phillip
Show 64 quoted lines
> Signed-off-by: sashashura <aleksandrosansan@gmail.com>
> ---
>      ci: restrict workflow's github token permissions
>      
>      This PR adds explicit permissions section
>      [https://docs.github.com/en/actions/using-workflows/workflow-syntax-for-github-actions#permissions]
>      to workflows. This is a security best practice because by default
>      workflows run with extended set of permissions
>      [https://docs.github.com/en/actions/security-guides/automatic-token-authentication#permissions-for-the-github_token]
>      (except from on: pull_request from external forks
>      [https://securitylab.github.com/research/github-actions-preventing-pwn-requests/]).
>      By specifying any permission explicitly all others are set to none. By
>      using the principle of least privilege the damage a compromised workflow
>      can do (because of an injection
>      [https://securitylab.github.com/research/github-actions-untrusted-input/]
>      or compromised third party tool or action) is restricted. It is
>      recommended to have most strict permissions on the top level
>      [https://github.com/ossf/scorecard/blob/main/docs/checks.md#token-permissions]
>      and grant write permissions on job level
>      [https://docs.github.com/en/actions/using-jobs/assigning-permissions-to-jobs]
>      case by case.
>      
>      check-whitespace.yml is triggered by pull_request only and receives
>      restricted token already. l10n.yml has permissions on job level already.
>      So I didn't make any changes to them. In both cases it is possible to
>      add explicit global lever permissions just for consistency if you
>      prefer. Let me know.
>      
>      Currently
>      [https://github.com/git/git/actions/runs/3100948073/jobs/5021781329] the
>      workflow runs with the following permissions: GITHUB_TOKEN Permissions
>      Actions: write Checks: write Contents: write Deployments: write
>      Discussions: write Issues: write Metadata: read Packages: write Pages:
>      write PullRequests: write RepositoryProjects: write SecurityEvents:
>      write Statuses: write
> 
> Published-As: https://github.com/gitgitgadget/git/releases/tag/pr-git-1337%2Fsashashura%2Fpatch-2-v1
> Fetch-It-Via: git fetch https://github.com/gitgitgadget/git pr-git-1337/sashashura/patch-2-v1
> Pull-Request: https://github.com/git/git/pull/1337
> 
>   .github/workflows/main.yml | 6 ++++++
>   1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
> 
> diff --git a/.github/workflows/main.yml b/.github/workflows/main.yml
> index 831f4df56c5..3ce9302c589 100644
> --- a/.github/workflows/main.yml
> +++ b/.github/workflows/main.yml
> @@ -5,8 +5,14 @@ on: [push, pull_request]
>   env:
>     DEVELOPER: 1
>   
> +permissions:
> +  contents: read
> +
>   jobs:
>     ci-config:
> +    permissions:
> +      contents: read
> +      actions: read # for github.actions.getWorkflowRun
>       name: config
>       runs-on: ubuntu-latest
>       outputs:
> 
> base-commit: dda7228a83e2e9ff584bf6adbf55910565b41e14

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