threads / patch / 51240

v2, 2 partsHarden url.c URL-decoding logic

Subject: [PATCH v2 0/2] Harden url.c URL-decoding logic

## tl;dr

5 messages between Jun 4, 2019 and Jun 4, 2019. Diffs are folded; open one to read it.

replies: 4people: 3as markdown or json

Matthew DeVore· Jun 4, 2019, 17:57 UTC · lore

This roll-up includes simple but important fixes from Brian Carlson and René Scharfe.

 - fix typo of "NUL" in commit heading
 - re-enable %-decoding in non-NULL-terminated strings
Matthew DeVore (2):
  url: do not read past end of buffer
  url: do not allow %00 to represent NUL in URLs
 url.c | 4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
-- 
2.21.0
Matthew DeVore· Jun 4, 2019, 17:57 UTC · re: Matthew DeVore · lore

[PATCH v2 1/2] url: do not read past end of buffer

url_decode_internal could have been tricked into reading past the length of the **query buffer if there are fewer than 2 characters after a % (in a null-terminated string, % would have to be the last character). Prevent this from happening by checking len before decoding the % sequence.

Helped-by: René Scharfe <l.s.r@web.de>
Signed-off-by: Matthew DeVore <matvore@google.com>
---
 url.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
Show changes to url.c +1 −1
diff --git a/url.c b/url.c
index 25576c390b..9ea9d5611b 100644
--- a/url.c
+++ b/url.c
@@ -39,21 +39,21 @@ static char *url_decode_internal(const char **query, int len,
 		unsigned char c = *q;
 
 		if (!c)
 			break;
 		if (stop_at && strchr(stop_at, c)) {
 			q++;
 			len--;
 			break;
 		}
 
-		if (c == '%') {
+		if (c == '%' && (len < 0 || len >= 3)) {
 			int val = hex2chr(q + 1);
 			if (0 <= val) {
 				strbuf_addch(out, val);
 				q += 3;
 				len -= 3;
 				continue;
 			}
 		}
 
 		if (decode_plus && c == '+')
-- 
2.21.0
Junio C Hamano· Jun 4, 2019, 20:27 UTC · re: Matthew DeVore · lore

Re: [PATCH v2 1/2] url: do not read past end of buffer

Matthew DeVore <matvore@google.com> writes:
Show 30 quoted lines
> url_decode_internal could have been tricked into reading past the length
> of the **query buffer if there are fewer than 2 characters after a % (in
> a null-terminated string, % would have to be the last character).
> Prevent this from happening by checking len before decoding the %
> sequence.
>
> Helped-by: René Scharfe <l.s.r@web.de>
> Signed-off-by: Matthew DeVore <matvore@google.com>
> ---
>  url.c | 2 +-
>  1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
>
> diff --git a/url.c b/url.c
> index 25576c390b..9ea9d5611b 100644
> --- a/url.c
> +++ b/url.c
> @@ -39,21 +39,21 @@ static char *url_decode_internal(const char **query, int len,
>  		unsigned char c = *q;
>  
>  		if (!c)
>  			break;
>  		if (stop_at && strchr(stop_at, c)) {
>  			q++;
>  			len--;
>  			break;
>  		}
>  
> -		if (c == '%') {
> +		if (c == '%' && (len < 0 || len >= 3)) {
>  			int val = hex2chr(q + 1);

This made me wonder what happens when the caller sent -1 in len, but hex2chr() stops on such a string with % plus one hexadecimal at the end of the string, and we'd end up copying these two bytes one at a time, which is what we want, so it is OK. And the rejection of %00 done in 2/2 follows the same codeflow here, which is quite straight forward.

Nice.
Show 9 quoted lines
>  			if (0 <= val) {
>  				strbuf_addch(out, val);
>  				q += 3;
>  				len -= 3;
>  				continue;
>  			}
>  		}
>  
>  		if (decode_plus && c == '+')
Matthew DeVore· Jun 4, 2019, 17:57 UTC · re: Matthew DeVore · lore

[PATCH v2 2/2] url: do not allow %00 to represent NUL in URLs

There is no reason to allow %00 to terminate a string, so do not allow it. Otherwise, we end up returning arbitrary content in the string (that which is after the %00) which is effectively hidden from callers and can escape sanity checks and validation, and possible be used in tandem with a security vulnerability to introduce a payload.

Helped-by: brian m. carlson <sandals@crustytoothpaste.net>
Signed-off-by: Matthew DeVore <matvore@google.com>
---
 url.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
Show changes to url.c +1 −1
diff --git a/url.c b/url.c
index 9ea9d5611b..1b8ef78cea 100644
--- a/url.c
+++ b/url.c
@@ -41,21 +41,21 @@ static char *url_decode_internal(const char **query, int len,
 		if (!c)
 			break;
 		if (stop_at && strchr(stop_at, c)) {
 			q++;
 			len--;
 			break;
 		}
 
 		if (c == '%' && (len < 0 || len >= 3)) {
 			int val = hex2chr(q + 1);
-			if (0 <= val) {
+			if (0 < val) {
 				strbuf_addch(out, val);
 				q += 3;
 				len -= 3;
 				continue;
 			}
 		}
 
 		if (decode_plus && c == '+')
 			strbuf_addch(out, ' ');
 		else
-- 
2.21.0
Matthew DeVore· Jun 4, 2019, 21:13 UTC · re: Matthew DeVore · lore

Re: [PATCH v2 0/2] Harden url.c URL-decoding logic

First message had incorrect recipient list. Re-sending with non-typo'd Jeff's e-mail address.

Someone also politely reminded me off-band that I should make subsequent versions of patchsets be respond-to on the cover-letter of v1 of that patchset. I will do that from next time.

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