From: Junio C Hamano Date: Fri, 06 Nov 2026 19:15:39 GMT Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 2/3] remote: do not show credentials when relative_url() fails Message-ID: In-Reply-To: <85924f20-298f-401e-88f7-7fb3f949d0fe@gmail.com> Derrick Stolee writes: > In environments that store stdout/stderr logs, those systems already > need to be careful about such strings in the commands themselves, let > alone the output strings. Hmph, is this true? How can these systems be _careful_ without knowing what these strings are? By guessing that https:// is a common enough thing that shoud raise red flag if there is some:thing@ that follows it? > And back to the bundle-URI application: if the bundle list uses such > URIs for its child bundles, then that's not a safe mechanism for > communicating those credentials. This isn't going to protect secrets > like that from being exposed. This is very true. So the patch may be protecting us against an issue that does not exist in practice? Where do we use anonymize_url() in existing code paths? - "git clone" leaving "clone: from X" in the reflog - "git fetch" showing "From X" to show ref updates - "git push" shwoing "Pushing to X" in verbose output - remote-curl talking about "url" in die() messages - transport showing "To X" to show push_report. These are all talking about what is shown on the screen except for the reflog entry left by "git clone", I think. Thanks.