From: Patrick Steinhardt Date: Wed, 12 Aug 2026 11:56:50 GMT Subject: Re: [PATCH] config: add http.sslVerifyHost option Message-ID: In-Reply-To: <7b833cd4-bad3-462a-9860-a8153d4f6b0d@noisytoot.org> On Wed, Aug 12, 2026 at 04:31:59AM +0100, Ron Nazarov wrote: > On 11/08/2026 13:40, Patrick Steinhardt wrote: > > On Fri, Aug 07, 2026 at 04:33:14PM +0100, Ron Nazarov wrote: > > > This allows for disabling host verification without completely > > > disabling TLS certificate verification. This is useful when using TLS > > > in a decentralized way (similar to how one would use SSH), where the > > > remote endpoint has a self-signed certificate that does not > > > necessarily have a valid CN (or any CN at all), and you set > > > http.sslCAInfo to that specific certificate. Without such an option, > > > it is impossible to use a certificate with a non-matching hostname > > > without completely disabling TLS verification, which is insecure. > > > > Arguably both options are insecure, this new option just pretends to be > > secure. If we accept arbitrary certificates for an endpoint, then it > > becomes trivial for somebody to perform a man-in-the-middle attack > > against you by simply swapping out the certificate against a self-signed > > one. And man-in-the-middle attacks are basically what we want to protect > > against with TLS. > > > > [...] > > > > Maybe I'm missing something obvious. But if so, I think both the commit > > message and the documentation would need to be amended to document that > > gap and state that yes, this is still insecure. > > > > The intention is for this to be combined with setting sslCAInfo and/or > sslCAPath to the specific self-signed certificate used for the remote > (rather than to something like a public CA where anyone can easily get a > certificate signed by it). If used on its own (with the default CA > certificate store) it is of course insecure. The commit message already > states this ("and you set http.sslCAInfo to that specific certificate", > although perhaps it could be made more clear that if you don't do this it is > insecure), but the documentation currently does not. The specific use-case > I am currently using this option for is a private git server accessible over > a public IPv6 address using a self-signed certificate which does not have a > valid CN (or a subjectAltName) at all. I have something like this in my > .gitconfig: > > [http "https://[2001:db8::1]/"] > sslCAInfo = /path/to/cert.pem > sslVerifyHost = false > sslCAPath = /dev/null > > where /path/to/cert.pem is the specific certificate served by the git > server, which I have verified externally to belong to the owner. This > provides the same security guarantees as using SSH with the server's > fingerprint in my known_hosts file. Okay, that's a whole lot more reasonable then. You essentially pin the certificate that you expect from the server-side, and as a result noone can intercept the traffic unless they have the private key. We should definitely update the documentation then to highlight how users can securely use `sslVerifyHost` so that they're not on their own to figure this out. > (Also, this is unrelated to your review, but for some reason my original > email containing the patch is missing from lore.kernel.org. I don't know > why, since people not in the CC list are replying, it presumably must have > been sent to the list.) Hm, curious. No idea why that is -- hopefully, v2 will land just fine. Patrick